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ABSTRACT
New methodology is proposed to assess the probability that the
planet Mars will -be bi6ologially contaminated-by terrestrial-microorgan-
isms aboard a spacecraft. Present NASA methods are based on the Sagan-
Coleman formula, which states that the probability of contamination is
the product of the expected microbial release and a probability of
growth. The proposed new methodology extends the Sagan-Coleman approach
to permit utilization of detailed information on microbial characteris-
tics, the lethality of release and transport mechanisms, and of other
information about the Martian environment. Three different types of
microbial release are distinguished in the model for assessing the prob-
ability of contamination. The number of viable microbes released by
each mechanism depends on the bio-burden in various locations on the
spacecraft and on whether the spacecraft landing is accomplished accord-
ing to plan. For each of the three release mechanisms a probability of
growth is computed, using a model for transport into an environment
suited to microbial growth.
This new methodology is used to assess the probability of contami-
nation of Mars by the Project Viking lander. Estimates of the bio-
burden provided by Project Viking, recent data on Mars, and recent de-
velopments in microbiology have been combined with the judgment of
experts in various fields to provide the basis for this assessment. The
probability of contamination for each of the 1975 Viking landers has
-6
been computed as 6 X 10 Y which is well below the mission constraint
-4
value of 10 imposed by NASA.
iii
There is currently less confidence in the probabilities input to
the model than in the structure of the model itself. Major uncertainties
still surround critical factors, like the amount of ultraviolet shielding
acquired by microbes and the extent of water and nutrients on Mars.
Illustrative calculations give a probability of only a few percent that
resolving these uncertainties would cause the probability of contamina-
-4
tion to exceed 10 . On the other hand, these calculations show a 50
percent chance that the probability .of contamination would be revised to
-6
less than 10
iv
PREFACE
The biological contamination of Mars is a complex issue involving
-a great-variety -of-scientif-i-cY engineering,..and policy cQnsiderations.
In many areas the information available is limited. Nonetheless, NASA
is committed to a planning process derived from the COSPAR resolutions
that is based on assessment of the probability of planetary contamina-
tion. The task facing the authors of this report was the development
of new methodology to carry out this assessment.
In applying this methodology to assessment of the contamination
probability for the Viking lander, the authors have been fortunate to
have the cooperation and assistance of a great many individuals and
organizations knowledgeable on the various aspects of this complex
issue. Ideally, the inputs and model structure of this report reflect
their collective information and judgment. However, the assessment
process has been carried out relatively quickly and informally. We have
not talked to all experts on each issue, and there are many instances
in which experts disagree. For our purpose the disagreement is important
only when it leads to different answers to the question, "Does the prob-
ability of contamination from the Viking lander exceed the NASA mission
constraint?" Our analysis indicates that the constraint is not exceeded.
Probability assignments and other inputs in the analysis have been
varied over a range judged to represent the change that might occur in
these inputs if more information were available. The extensive sensi-
tivity analysis of Section IV shows that the conclusion that the con-
straint is not exceeded does not change as each input is varied through
v
its range of values. The assessment process could be refined consider-
ably. More formal procedures could be used to elicit values for the
input quantities from which the probability of contamination is calcula-
ted,. and more detail and structure could be included in the assessment
process.
The analysis that has been carried out indicates that the probabil-
ity of contamination is well below the mission constraint. Therefore,
the authors are not recommending that this analysis be refined further
at this time. We realize, however, that our conclusions in this respect
depend on the information used in the analysis. We hope that the commu-
nity of scientists concerned with planetary quarantine will give our
analysis a careful and critical review, and that they will bring to our
attention any points on which the analysis differs with the body of
scientific knowledge related to the contamination of Mars.
For reasons set forth in this report the authors believe that the
present NASA planning process on planetary quarantine can be improved.
The procedures currently being used are based on proposals made a decade
ago before any interplanetary exploration had been carried out. We now
have much better information about the environments on other planets,
and in the next decade we will face a multitude of space exploration
decisions in which planetary quarantine considerations will assume great
importance.
We believe that the use of formal models for planning quarantine
policy represents a substantial advance over NASA's current approach,
which relies on a single parameter: the probability of growth. A
detailed structural basis for assessing the probability of microbial
growth facilitates critical examination and revision in the light of new
scientific information.
vi
We recommend that NASA replace the current procedure of determining
mission sterilization requirements on the basis of a single parameter, the
probability of growth, by a procedure that distinguishes between types
of organisms, types of release mechanisms, and other characteristics
that affect whether an individual viable terrestrial organism from a
-spacecraft. willreproduce in the environment of another planet.
vii
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1 REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF METHODOLOGY NOW USED
TO ASSESS THE PROBABILITY OF PLANETARY CONTAMINATION
1.1 Review of the Sagan-Coleman Approach
During the early 1960s, concern about biological contamination led
to international agreement that suitable quarantine procedures would be
employed on spacecraft sent to other planets. Attention was focused
on the planet Mars because it was judged that Mars might be capable of
supporting terrestrial microorganisms. In 1966 the Committee on Space
Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions
adopted a resolution that spacefaring nations conduct their unmanned
exploration of Mars in such a way that the total probability of contamina-
-3
tion during a specified quarantine period not exceed 103. The probabi-
listic model of planetary contamination advanced by Sagan and Coleman
was the stimulus and theoretical foundation for this COSPAR resolution
and the basis for NASA's current planning procedures for planetary
quarantine.
The main problem Sagan and Coleman addressed was calculating a
probability of contamination [P(C)I of Mars for various possible sequences
of unmanned missions during the quarantine period. They also addressed
the question of how the probability of contamination for an individual
imission could be computed. Their procedure, stated without detailed
justification, was to use the approximation
P(C) = E(N) P(G) , (1.1)
1
where
C - the cvent that Mars will be biologically contaminated
by terrestrial organisms aboard the spacecraft
N = the number of viable terrestrial organisms (VTOs) re-
leased to the Martian environment or into its atmo-
sphere from the spacecraft (a random variable)
E(N) = k P(N=k)
k=O
= the expected (or mean) number of VTOs released
G = the event that a single VTO will grow, meaning that it
would survive, multiply, and contaminate a significant
fraction of the planet.
We shall refer to Eq. (1.1) as the Sagan-Coleman formula. It forms the
underlying basis for the assessments of the probability of planetary
contamination as they are currently carried out by NASA in the planning
of all unmanned missions outside the earth-moon system.
The research task undertaken by the Decision Analysis Group of
Stanford Research Institute for the Planetary Quarantine Officer of
NASA has been to reexamine the appropriateness of the Sagan-Coleman
formula as a basis for NASA planning. The initial contract was to carry
out a detailed critique of the Sagan-Coleman formula.2  The second con-
tract, reported herein, has been to develop new methodology appropriate
for assessing the probability of biological contamination and to apply
this methodology to the Project Viking Mars lander. For the convenience
of the reader, the earlier research is summarized below and in Appendix A.
1.2 Critique of the Sagan-Coleman Formula
Sagan and Coleman examined the problem of planetary contamination
a decade ago. Their formulation is an approximation that may have been
adequate considering the knowledge available in 1965, but that is no
2
longer adequate considering the much more extensive knowledge available
today. Possible problems inherent in using the Sagan-Coleman formulation
as a basis for planning lie in the following areas:
(1) The definition of "growth" and "contamination".
(2) The approximation of small bio-burden.
(3) The assumptions of independence about microbial growth
and release.
(4) The failure to distinguish among different types of micro-
organisms in the assessing the probability of growth [P(G)].
Problems arising in the first three areas are not particularly
serious and are easily remedied. The fourth difficulty, failure to
distinguish among microorganisms in assessing P(G), may be overcome by
extending the Sagan-Coleman formula to apply separately to different
classes of organisms. This approach is the basis for the new methodology
described in this report.
The assessment of small probabilities is generally a difficult task.
The complex economic, technological, and policy issues surrounding space
exploration greatly increase the difficulty of obtaining accurate, un-
biased assessments of the probability of planetary contamination. A
more comprehensive formulation would include the effect of the decision
context on the probability assessment process. The advisability of a
reformulation is discussed at the end of this section, but the accomplish-
ment of the reformulation is outside the scope of this report.
1.2.1 Definitions of "Growth" and "Contamination"
The first difficulty with the Sagan-Coleman paper and the
COSPAR resolution is a question of definition. What is meant by growth,
and what is meant by contamination? The Sagan-Coleman paper is not very
explicit in defining these terms:
3
... the landing of unsterilized space vehicles on Mars may ob-
scure subsequent attempts to detect in a pristine state in-
digenou:s lif on "'a' plane'. To avoid possible biological
contamination of Mars, it is clear that entry vehicles should
be carefully and conscientiously sterilized.
1
The 1964 and 1966 COSPAR resolutions were no more explicit
in defining "contamination." The term has been defined in the planetary
quarantine literature, but not very precisely. The following definition
represents one of the most precise in the planetary quarantine literature:
A planet will be considered to have been contaminated if one
or more microorganisms of terrestrial origin are deposited on
its surface or into its atmosphere and then grow and spread
so as to bias future biological exploration over a specified
period of time.3
The vagueness of the definition was perhaps reasonable in view of the
stringent requirements that COSPAR was considering at the time. The
1964 COSPAR resolution stated:
The probability that a single viable organism be aboard any
spacecraft intended for planetary landing must be less than
1 X 10- 4 ... [and] ... the probability limit for accidental
planetary impact by an unsterilized flyby or orbiter must be
less than 3 X 10- 5 during the interval terminating at the end
of the initial period of planetary exploration by landing
vehicles (approximately one decade).'
-4
By limiting to 10 the probability that even one viable
terrestrial organism would reach the environment of another planet, the
COSPAR resolution effectively set that same number as the upper limit
for the probability that the planet would be contaminated. The details
of how a viable microbe aboard a spacecraft might affect Mars are not
so significant if we assess as less than 1 in 10,000 the chance that a
viable microbe will in fact reach the planet. However, when we realize
t.hat the Viking landes are presently assumed to have on board on the
4
order of 2 X 10 viable microbes it is apparent that the situation has
4
changed dramatically. The need for a more precise definition of con-
tamination assumes greater importance.
In our analysis we have not attempted to resolve what is
meant by such phrases as "grow and spread," or "contamination of a sig-
nificant fraction of the planet." Instead we have chosen to avoid the
definitional difficulty by assigning "growth" and "contamination" defini-
tions that are more restrictive but less ambiguous than the previous
usage. Throughout this report "growth" will mean that a VTO has repli-
cated itself in the Martian environment, using nutrients obtained from
Mars rather than from the spacecraft. "Contamination" will mean that
growth has occurred within the quarantine period. (Notice that contamina-
tion of Project Viking biology experiments does not necessarily fall
within our definitions. We do not count as contamination the reproduc-
tion of VTOs using nutrients obtained on board the spacecraft.) Our
definitions are more restrictive than previous usage, for no matter what
amount of growth is taken to imply "contamination of the planet," the
process must begin with a single reproduction. Given that a single
reproduction does occur, it seems reasonable to assume that the proba-
bility of subsequent reproductions is on the order of unity. Rather
than attempt to determine how many subsequent reproductions are necessary
for "significant" contamination, we would prefer to see consideration
given to a general reformulation of the planetary quarantine problem.
1.2.2 The Approximation of Small Bio-Burden
The Sagan-Coleman formula (1.1) is an approximation based
on a Bernoulli model for the growth of individual microbes. Contamina-
tion occurs if one or more microbes grow; therefore the event that con-
tamination does not occur implies that none of the microbes that are
viably released reproduce:
5
1 - P(C) P(N = k)[l - P(G)]k (1.2)
k=0
We expand [1 - P(G)]k as a power series, and if k P(G) << 1 for all
values N = k of significant probability, we can drop all but first-order
terms in k P(G) and we obtain the formula (1.1):
P(C) = E(N) P(G)
To see the implications of this approximation, consider the
-6
case where the probability of growth, P(G), is 10 and the number of
7
microbes released, N is 10 . Naive use of Eq. (1.1) leads to a proba-
bility of 10, which is clearly in error since probabilities are defined
to lie in the range from zero to 1. If Eq. (1.2) is used to calculate
the probability of contamination, the results are:
P(C) = 1 - [1 - P(G)] N  (1.3)
-5
= 1 - 4 X 10 (1.4)
5 7
Figure 1.1 shows how P(C) varies with N over the range N = 10 to N = 10
7
The probability of contamination remains linear in N, the
number of organisms released, as long as N is much smaller than l/P(G),
the reciprocal of the probability of growth. If the probability of re-
lease of a number of organisms comparable to l/P(G) is very small, Eq.
(1.1) will be an excellent approximation of Eq. (1.2). The approximation
is conservative in that Eq. (1.1) will give a higher value for the proba-
bility of contamination than Eq. (1.2).
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FIGURE 1.1 COMPARISON OF LINEAR APPROXIMATION (EQ. 1.1)
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1.2.3 Assumptions of Independence About Microbial
Growth and Release
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Equation (1.3) shows how P(C) depends on N. If P(G) = 10-6
5 7
and N = 10 , we find P(C) = 0.0955 a 0.10. If N = 10 , then P(C) =
-5
1 - 4 X 10 = 0.99996. This result occurs without the approximation of
small bio-burden by which Eq. (1.1) is derived from Eq. (1.2). The re-
7
sult implies that for a release of 10 organisms, contamination is a
virtual certainty. On the basis of this probability, a reasonable man
should be willing to bet at odds of 1,000 to 1 that contamination of
7
Mars will occur if 10 microorganisms are released onto Mars. However,
5
if only 10 microorganisms are released. the probability of contamination
is less than 10 percent.
7
This conclusion, which is based on the Bernoulli trials
model implicitly underlying the Sagan-Coleman formula, is not consistent
with the present state of scientific information about Mars. Most ex-
perts would not conclude that contamination of Mars is a near certainty,
no matter how many viable terrestrial microorganisms are released. For
example, there may be no water on Mars in a form usable by any microbes
to accomplish reproduction. Because we are uncertain about Martian
environmental factors, such as the existence of usable water, we are un-
certain about P(G). This uncertainty conflicts with independence assump-
tions in the model underlying Eq. (1.2).
Our first report dealt largely with the independence assump-
tions that underlie the Sagan-Coleman formula. The assumption of the
Bernoulli trials model--that release and the growth, given release, of
individual microbes are independent events--is not necessary. A more
general formulation is possible, which leads to a nonlinear relation
between the expected number of VTOs released, E(N), and the probability
of contamination, P(C). This formulation is discussed in Appendix A,
which summarizes the earlier report.
Relaxation of the independence assumption leads to a consid-
erable increase in the difficulty of the assessment process. Assessments
of the following form must be obtained: If a large number VTOs (e.g.,
10 ) were released into the Martian environment, what is the probability
that at least 0.001 percent of them (e.g., 1 part in 105) would survive
and result in growth? Figure A.8 in Appendix A shows a probability dis-
tribution constructed from judgments of this type.
If the number of released organisms is small compared with
the reciprocal of the probability of growth, the error introduced by
assuming independence among surviving individual microbes is small. This
error is conservative in the sense that the effect of the independence
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assumption is to overstate the probability of contamination. The inde-
pendence assumptions lead to the unwarranted conclusion that contamination
is nearly certain only when the number of microbes released exceeds the
reciprocal of P(G) by at least 1 order of magnitude (Eq. (1.4)). Except
for the possibility of contamination in the bioexperiment, such high levels
of microbial release are not judged possible. Therefore, the error in-
troduced by assuming independence is not significant in our analysis.
The assumption of independence among microbial survival events has been
maintained.
A more serious problem inherent in the Sagan-Coleman formula
is the assumption of independence between the number of microbes released
and the event that a microbe survives. Other factors enter into deter-
mining the likelihood of growth or release. For example, the type of
landing made by a spacecraft can have a significant effect on both the.
number of VTOs released and their subsequent survival rate. A hard
landing by the spacecraft can result in much larger microbial release
than a soft landing. A hard landing also makes growth more likely, be-
cause microbes are implanted directly in Martian soil without significant
exposure to ultraviolet (UV) radiation. The analytical methodology de-
scribed below rectified this shortcoming of the Sagan-Coleman approach
by explicitly including in the model the dependence of the microbial
release mechanism on the type of landing.
Contamination of the biology experiment may result in release
levels large enough so that the errors stemming from the independence
assumption and the approximation of small bio-burden become substantial.
As a result, contamination of the biology experiment will be handled in
a special manner in our analysis. However, using the probability cur-
rently assigned to bioexperiment contamination, this term does not con-
tribute significantly to the overall probability of planetary contamina-
tion.
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1.2.4 Failure to Distinguish Among Microorganisms
in Assessing P(G)
The most serious problem in the use of the Sagan-Coleman
formula is its aggregation of the types of microorganisms, of the mech-
anisms by which microbes would be released in a viable condition into
the Martian environment, and of the locations on Mars in which the microbes
might be deposited. P(G) and E(N) have been used by the planetary quaran-
tine community to refer to a randomly selected organism, with no specifi-
cation of the type of organism or how and where it is introduced into the
Martian environment. This approach ignores important available informa-
tion and places an exceedingly difficult task on the scientific experts
who are asked to assign P(G). Furthermore, by a relatively straight-
forward extension of the Sagan-Coleman approach, the problem can be
circumvented. The remainder of the report presents a refined methodology
for assessing P(G).
1.3 Rational for Amendments to the Sagan-Coleman Approach
The Sagan-Coleman approach can be extended to include explicitly
information on organism characteristics, release mechanism, and landing
site. We now review the reasons why the extensions are important.
1.3.1 Organism Characteristics
All microbes on a spacecraft are not identical. The microbes
deserving serious concern are those capable of adapting to the extremely
hostile environment on Mars. What characteristics must a microbe have
to survive and reproduce on Mars? Since Mars has little or no free
oxygen, the microbe should be facultatively anaerobic, that is, able to
reproduce in the absence of oxygen. All terrstrial life requircs water
and must be able to obtain it in a liquid or otherwise usable form. The
extremely low temperatures and pressures on Mars make the existence of
10
liquid phase water extremely improbable. If usable water does exist, it
is likely to be in the form of concentrated salt solutions or melting
ice trapped under dust. Because water usable by microbes is unlikely
to exist at temperatures significantly above OOC, the microbe should be
facultatively psychrophilic, that is, able to reproduce in a temperature
range of OOC or below.
The first amendment to the Sagan-Coleman approach should be
to specify that we are concerned not so much with the total population
of microbes on the spacecraft as with the subpopulation of microbes that
are both facultative anaerobes and facultative psychrophiles. Further-
more,. since the Viking lander will receive terminal dry heat steriliza-
tion, it is virtually certain that all surviving organisms on the space-
craft will be spores. A small fraction of the naturally occurring spore
population seems to be extremely resistant to dry heat sterilization.
How large is the subpopulation of VTOs in the spacecraft
bio-burden that is facultatively both anaerobic and psychrophilic? This
question can be addressed by experimentation in terrestrial microbiology
laboratories, but it has received virtually no attention until recently.
Our estimate that 5 percent of the spacecraft bio-burden is facultatively
both psychrophilic and anaerobic is based on judgment rather than on
experimental data. It is hoped that current experimental programs will
provide a better estimate of this quantity in the near future.
The importance of organism characteristics was noted six years ago by
Sagan, Levinthal, and Lederberg.4
Preliminary results from this research are discussed in subsection 3.4.
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1.3.2 Release Mechanism
A second needed amendment to the Sagan-Coleman approach is
to specify the means by which the microbe is released into the Martian
environment. The UV radiation flux on the Martian surface is strong
enough to kill any unprotected terrestrial microorganisms in a matter
of minutes. A microorganism implanted directly into Martian soil will
therefore have a much better chance of surviving than a microbe that
rests for many days on the exterior surface of the spacecraft.
1.3.3 Landing Site
As we suggested in our earlier report, the location of the
spacecraft landing might be another characteristic to be taken into
account in modifying the Sagan-Coleman formula. If it is judged that
the probability of a microbe reaching usable water is highly dependent
on the location where the microbe is released, then the probability of
growth should be assessed also on the basis of the spacecraft landing
site. However, planetwide dust storms could conceivably transport
a microbe from the spacecraft to any point on the surface of the planet.
Our assessments correspond to the general mid-latitude location of the
Viking 1975 landing sites. If further information indicates that liquid
water on Mars is found only in a small region of the planet's surface,
the model could be expanded to include more precisely the dependence on
landing site.
1.4 An Extension of the Sagan-Coleman Formula
One approach in assessing the probability of contamination will be
to use an expanded version of the Sagan-Coleman formula:1
P(C) = Pi k(G) E(Ni k )  (1.4)
i,k
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where the index k refers to the type of organism and the index i refers
to the way in which the microbe is released into the Martian environment.
1.4.1 Type of Organism
For our analysis we have distinguished two types of organisms:
k = 1, organisms that are facultatively both anaerobic
and psychrophilic
k = 2, all other organisms.
We shall assume that the probability of growth for organisms that are
not facultatively both anaerobic and psychrophilic is on the order of
-9
10 or below. Based on this assumption, we can conclude that these
other organisms do not contribute significantly to the probability of
planetary contamination. We shall therefore drop the subscript k and
concern ourselves only with k = 1.
1.4.2 Release Mechanisms
We have distinguished three mechanisms for release of organ-
isms into the Martian environment:
i = 1, direct implantation of a microbe into Martian soil
i = 2, release by aeolian erosion, presumably during a
Martian dust storm, and
i = 3, release from the surface of the spacecraft into
the Martian atmosphere due to mechanical vibration,
thermal effects, or any other means.
By defining category i = 3 to include all other mechanisms for viable
microbe release, we have thereby established a mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive set of release mechanisms. Our task now becomes
one of assessing the probability of growth, Pi(G), and expected number
of microbes released, E(Ni), for the three different categories.
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1.5 The Assessment of Small Probabilities
Thc asscssment of probabuiities on Lhe order of 0.001 or less is
at best a difficult task. The problem is that when asked to assess
probabilities smaller than, say, 1/100, we all have difficulty conjuring
up familiar reference events that we perceive to be of comparable likeli-
-2 -3
hood. In many applications a probability of 10 or 10 can in fact
be used as a working definition of impossibility. It might be argued
that scientists are more comfortable than most people in working with
-3
numbers as small as 10-3 ; however, we are not convinced that even they
are accustomed to using numbers of this magnitude to summarize their
judgment about complex, unlikely events.
1.5.1 Reference Events
Providing a set of familiar reference events against which
relative likelihood can be compared is one way an analyst can aid in
the task of assessing the likelihood of rare events. For example, if a
-4
person says that he assesses the probability of Event E1 to be 10 and
-6
the probability of Event E2 to be 10 , we can be quite sure that he
considers both events unlikely, and E1 more likely than E2 . Experience
indicates, however, that caution should be used in attaching any absolute
significance to the numerical assessments. Would this same person, for
example, rather bet on Event E2 occurring or on being dealt a royal flush
in a game of five-card stud poker? Since calculation will show that
the probability of being dealt a royal flush in that situation is about
There is a large literature on probability assessment, but very little
of it is addressed to assessing the probability of rare events.5,6,7
The SRI Decision Analysis Group is preparing a research memorandum
describing methodology for assessing small probabilities. This memo-
randum will be available in the summer of 1974.
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1.5 X 10- 6 , the person's assessment of the probability of Event E 2 as
-6
10 would lead to the logical conclusion that he would prefer to bet
on the royal flush. Nevertheless, if the question of preference were
asked directly ("Would you rather bet on Event E2 occuring or on the
possibility of being dealt a royal flush?"), he might answer that he
prefers to bet on E2 . This would mean that he had in effect revised
his assessment of the probability of E2
1.5.2 Modeling and Decomposing Complex Events
Rare events can frequently be broken down into a sequence
of required component events. It is often useful to enrich the model
structure to include the sequence and then encode the conditional proba-
bility of each event, given the occurrence of its predecessors. By using
this procedure we enable the expert to assess only probabilities of a
readily comprehensible magnitude.
1.5.3 Assessing the Probability of Microbial Growth
and Contamination
We will use this modeling approach to assess P (G) and there-
1
fore P(C). For microbial growth to occur, the following sequence of
events is required:
(1) Usable water must exist on Mars.
(2) The microbe must reach this usable water in a
viable condition.
(3) The nutrients required for microbial reproduction
must exist at the site of the usable water.
We will assess probabilities for each event and use them to develop the
probability of growth and then the overall probability of contamination.
This modeling approach is similar to the process used to
-6
arrive at the assessment of P(G) of 10-6 for Mars currently being used
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by NASA.s  A conference of scientists meeting at Woods Hole in July 1970
assessed P(G) by considering the fraction of terrestrial microbes that
might be suited to the Martian environment, the probability that usable
water and other nutrients would be present on Mars, and the probability
that "sufficient" numbers of viable terrestrial microorganisms could
reach these locations to cause contamination. 9'0' 11 Unfortunately, the
assumptions, definitions, and probability computations used in this
assessment were never formally documented so that they could be checked
and revised as further information became available. Furthermore, the
-6
value of P(G) = 10 was established as a compromise between the even-
-9 -4
odds (median) estimate of 3 X 10 and the maximum estimate of 1 X 10 ,
which was the parameter value actually recommended to NASA by the Review
-6
Group.1 1  The setting of P(G) = 10 was to a large extent an arbitrary
choice, and the determination of this parameter has remained a source of
uneasiness within the planetary quarantine community.
1.6 Difficulties Arising from the Decision Context
The difficulties experienced at the Woods Hole Conference highlight
a basic problem in the Sagan-Coleman formulation of the planetary con-
tamination problem. The formulation fails to distinguish value judgments
about contamination from judgments on the likelihood that this event will
occur. Various reasons have been given for concern over contamination:
the loss of scientific data on indigenous Martian life, a moral obliga-
tion to protect indigenous life from potentially hostile terrestrial
organisms, possible effects on the potential for reengineering the planet,
and so forth.1 ,3, 4, 1 2 ,1 3  Scientists who believe that the biological
contamination of Mars could be a major catastrophe for the human race
will argue for a more conservative assessment of P(G), while scientists
who envision contamination in less dramatic terms will argue that the
zealous attention given to planetary quarantine considerations imposes
16
unwarranted costs and reliability penalties on space missions to Mars.
The 1966 COSPAR resolution reflects a compromise between these viewpoints.
-3
Placing an upper limit of 10 on the probability of "significant" con-
tamination during the period of unmanned exploration was agreed on as an
acceptable way to include quarantine considerations in the planning of
Mars missions.
1.6.1 Meeting the NASA Mission Constraint
In accordance with the 1966 COSPAR resolution, NASA has
established a mission constraint for Project Viking that the maximum
limit of the estimated probability that each flight of the specified
-4
mission will result in microbial contamination is 1 X 10 Having
based our analysis on improved assessment measures and the most recent
information available to us, we conclude that this mission constraint
would not be violated. To put this conclusion in perspective, we con-
sidered whether additional information might lead to a revision of the
assessed probability of contamination that would be sufficient to cause
a violation of the NASA mission constraint. On the basis of approximate
calculations, it appears that the probability of additional information
-4
causing the contamination probability to be revised to a value above 10
is on the order of a few percent.
1.6.2 Implicit Value Judgments
The value judgments on contamination that are implicit in
the COSPAR resolution remain a source of concern. Some scientists have
argued for a conservative assessment of the probability of contamination;
this approach immediately raises the question of how much conservatism
is enough.,1sl 1 4  We believe that a much better approach is to make
explicit the value judgments about microbial proliferation on Mars and
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its relation to the goals of a Mars exploration program. The existence
of indigenous life on Mars should have an important bearing on the im-
portance of contamination by terrestrial organisms. Suppose, for example
that it could be determined that Mars has no indigenous life but that
its geological, chemical, and physical characteristics provide a strong
incentive for continued unmanned exploration of the planet. Should this
-3
exploration be carried out under the present 10 COSPAR constraint,
with its implicit penalties in cost and reliability, or should the con-
straint be relaxed? Or suppose that Mars were known to have simple in-
digenous life forms of a type that is easily metabolized by terrestrial
organisms. What implications would this information have for the planning
of future unmanned exploration? Should much more stringent sterilization
requirements be placed on space missions to Mars, given this new set of
conditions? The planning approach embodied in the 1966 COSPAR resolution
lacks flexibility to reexamine the consequences of microbial prolifera-
tion as more is learned about the Martian environment. A broader approach
should be taken to enable planning on quarantine strategy to be more
responsive to the state of scientific knowledge and the concerns of the
scientific community.
1.7 The Advisability of a Decision Analysis
of Quarantine Strategy
It would be highly desirable to have a decision framework to address
the question of quarantine strategy. Important decisions will be taken
in the coming years about missions to the outer planets and the return
of a soil sample from Mars. The suitability of decision analysis con-
cepts to the quarantine problem has already been pointed out;4 the
methodology and procedures have been applied to similar complex problems
in space project planningl4 ,15,1 and other large-scale scientific re-
search programs.1 s  A decision analysis reformulation would make explicit
the meaning of the term "contamination." This definition would be
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structured so that it could be responsive to new information accumulated
in the course of ongoing space exploration. For example, knowledge about
the existence and types of indigenous life on Mars could be taken into
account in determining what probability of contamination should be con-
sidered acceptable in missions to the planet. The analysis would also
make explicit the interaction between quarantine procedures and space-
craft cost and reliability.
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2 SUMMARY OF NEW METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
This section presents a brief overview of the model developed to
assess the probability of contamination resulting from a specific space
mission, such as the Project Viking lander. The relation between the
methodology described here and current NASA procedures for assessing the
probability of contamination should be readily apparent; we shall clarify
those points that are not obvious. A summary of findings follows discus-
sion of the model.
2.1 The Mission Contamination Model
An overview of the model for assessing the probability of planetary
contamination is shown in Figure 2.1. The model is composed of four
components or submodels that describe successively (1) the bio-burden on
the Viking lander, (2) microbial release mechanisms, (3) transport in
the Martian environment, and (4) the resistance of terrestrial microbes
to the Martian environment and the availability of nutrients needed for
microbial reproduction on Mars. Communication among the submodels is
through a set of intermediate variables that describe the expected number
of VTOs that undergo various specific events, such as release from the
spacecraft.
The overall output from the model is the expected number of organisms
that reproduce on the planet. Reproduction on the planet by one or more
organisms is regarded as implying contamination. Since the expected
number of organisms that reproduce on the planet is much less than unity,
we can interpret this output quantity as the probability of contamination
of Mars. PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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BIO-BURDEN RELEASE TRANSPORT REPRODUCTION
External Implantation RESISTANCE
STERILIZATION LANDING MODE USABLE WATER TO
Reach ENVIRONMENT
Covered Usable
Water Growth PROBABILITY
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Mated MECHANISM MECHANISM CONTAWINATION
NUTRIENTS
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Arrows represent transfer of viable terrestrial organisms (VTOs).
FIGURE 2.1 MISSION CONTAMINATION MODEL
Before describing these submodels in detail, we shall describe
their relationship to the Sagan-Coleman formula: P(C) = E(N) P(G). The
first two submodels allow a determination of the expected number of VTOs
released in each of three fashions. These quantities correspond to the
microbial release term E(N) in the Sagan-Coleman formula. Our formulation
differs from current NASA procedure in that we distinguish three possible
fashions in which a microbe may be viably released; this is done for
four categories of microbe location on the spacecraft. Present NASA
procedures give a single probability of release for each location category;
our methodology uses three.
The last two submodels address the question of whether a VTO that
has been released into the Martian environment (in one of three fashions)
will survive and reproduce. These two submodels correspond to the term
P(G) in the Sagan-Coleman formula. Again, the procedure differs from
standard NASA procedures in that three different types of release are
distinguished.
In addition, release of a large quantity of microbes because of con-
tamination of the bioexperiment is considered in a separate calculation.
Because the quantity of VTOs released would be large, the approximation
of small bio-burden needed for the Sagan-Coleman formula would not hold.
However, if contamination did occur, it is reasonable to assume that all
organisms would be of the same type. Therefore, the upper bound on the
contribution of bioexperiment contamination to planetary contamination
can be cpud as the probability of biexperiment min n im
the probability that the organisms will be facultatively both psychrophilic
and anaerobic. Using this calculation, we can show that the contribu-
tion from bioexperiment contamination is negligible compared with other
sources for planetary contamination. We shall now consider the four sub-
models.
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2.1.1 Bio-Burden Submodel
The first submodel is intended to provide the subsequent
analysis with the number of microorganisms existing on the Viking lander
when it lands on the planet Mars. This biological load is characterized
not only by the type of microorganism but also by its location on the
lander. Four location types are considered:
0 External surface.
* Covered surface (the interior surface of a container).
* Mated surface (contact surface between two parts of
the spacecraft).
* Encapsulated in solid materials.
Included in this submodel are the number and type of organisms at various
locations prior to sterilization, the reduction in bio-burden effected
by the sterilization requirements, possible recontamination and increase
or decrease of the microorganism population during transit to Mars. The
outputs from the Bio-Burden Submodel are the number, type, and location
of microorganisms on the lander when it lands on Mars.
(Note: Detailed versions of bio-burden submodels have been
developed and continuously revised under the supervision of the Viking
Project team. Although we have carried out some investigation of these
issues on our own, we have used in our analysis a set of numbers developed
by the Viking Project team.1 9 )
2.1.2 Release Submodel
The Release Submodel uses the bio-burden profile as input.
It represents explicitly the uncertainty in the landing mode (hard or
soft) and the release mechanism. Three release mechanisms are considered:
Implantation (organisms put in direct contact with
the ground by the lander, e.g., on the landing
pads).
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* Aeolian erosion.
* Vibration (organisms falling off the lander because
of mechanical operations, thermal effects, and the
like).
The lethality of these mechanisms and the number of microbes exposed to
them are considered. The output from the Release Submodel is the number
of VTOs released by each mechanism. The release mechanism is important
because it influences the lethality of the subsequent transport process.
Specifically, the amount of UV radiation received by a microbe is assumed
to depend on its release mechanism.
2.1.3 Transport Submodel
Unless a microbe from the lander is directly implanted in a
hospitable water microenvironment, Martian winds or other transport
mechanisms are needed to transport it there. However, since a microbe
will be exposed to high levels of UV radiation during transport, it may
be killed or immobilized before reaching a water microenvironment. These
transport and lethality processes have been represented by a dynamic
probabilistic model, specifically, a six-state Markov process. Each
of the three release mechanisms corresponds to a separate starting state
in this process. The probability of a microbe reaching a hospitable
water microenvironment has been assigned, using a side calculation based
on the two most likely hypotheses for the existence of usable water.
The output from the Transport Submodel is the expected number of VTOs
reaching a mnicroenvironment wiih usable water.
2.1.4 Reproduction Submodel
Finally, given that a VTO has reached a hospitable water
microenvironment, we examine the circumstances required for its reproduc-
tion. The organism must be facultatively anaerobic, resistant to the
25
extreme low temperatures in the Martian diurnal cycle, and able to re-
produce at temperatures near or below O'C. It must also be able to
acquire the nutrients necessary for microbial reproduction. The output
from the Reproduction Submodel is the number of organisms expected to
grow and reproduce in the Martian environment.
The complete Mission Contamination Model permits the proba-
bility of contamination to be expressed as a function of the relevant
input variables in the four submodels. It represents the application
of a general methodology to the evaluation of the risk of contamination.
Conclusions from the model, which are reported in detail in Sections 4
and 5, are summarized in the following subsection.
2.2 Results of the Analysis
Application of the new methodology that we have described shows
that, given the present state of scientific information, the probability
-6
of biological contamination by each of the two Viking landers is 6 X 10
This value is approximately a factor of 16 below the mission constraint
imposed by NASA.
Figure 2.2, which reproduces the structure of the model presented
in Figure 2.1, indicates the crucial variables and the major intermediate
results at each point in the model. The expected number of VTOs trans-
ferred from one submodel to the next is indicated on each arrow linking
the components. Also, the box representing each submodel contains a list
of the critical variables pertaining to this part of the model.
Before we discuss in more detail the major sources of uncertainty
in the model, another important result, not apparent in Figure 2.2,
must be given: the probability of growth of a microbe varies widely
with its release mechanism. A VTO released by implantation is not im-
mediately exposed to the UV radiations and has a probability of growth
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FIGURE 2.2 MISSION CONTAMINATION MODEL RESULTS
-5
of 2.8 X 10 5. At the other extreme, a microbe released by erosion must
survive transport in a Martian dust storm and is 100 times less likely
to grow and reproduce than a microbe released by implantation; its proba-
-7
bility of growth is 2.8 X 10 . Microbes released by vibration have an
intermediate chance of surviving. Since they were initially located on
exposed surfaces and are released in a viable state, they must already
be shielded from UV radiations. However, because they fall on the surface
of the Martian soil, they have less chance of reaching a microenvironment
with usable water than microbes that are implanted directly into the soil.
The probability of growth for microbes released by vibration is about
-6
5.3 X 10 These findings clearly indicate the importance of condition-
ing the probability of growth on the release mechanism.
2.3 Identification of Crucial Variables
The above results, of course, reflect the present state of scientific
information, which is characterized by large uncertainties. Critical
variables are those where the uncertainty has a significant effect on
the probability of contamination. These variables are listed and de-
scribed in Table 2.1.
For ease of reference, the model variables will often be designated
in this report by the short definition or the four character symbol shown
in Table 2.1. Columns 2, 3, and 4, of Table 2.2 represent low, nominal,
and high values for each variable. No exact probabilistic definition has
been given for the low and high values, but they may be viewed as repre-
senting approximately 5 and 95 percentiles. The last two columns of
Table 2.2 represent low and high values of the probability of contamina-
tion when each of the 13 variables in the table is given its low and
high values and other variables are held constant at their nominal values.
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Table 2.1
NOMENCLATURE OF CONTAMINATION SUBMODEL VARIABLES
Alternate Nominal
Main Symbol Variable Name te e Nminl Definition
Symbols Value
Bio-burden Submodel
Output variables--expected number of VTOs on
lander in each of four location types:
tbio External b1  11 External surfaces
2bio Covered b2  16 Covered surfaces
3bio Mated b3  9 Mated surfaces
4bio Encapsulated b4  20,000 . Encapsulated in solid materials
Release Submodel
State variables
Irel Hard landing * 0.002 Probability of a hard landing
Newly hard landing; t Probability that an organism on a covered or
2rel exposed covered or mated a, ne 0.1 mated surface will be newly exposed on hard
expo 0r landing
3rel jNewly hard landing;} af 0.001 Probability that an encapsulated organism will
exposed encapsulated ne be newly exposed on hard landing
4
rel Implantedl soft landing 0.001 (Probability that an organism located on an ex-
ternal surface will be implanted on soft landing
Probability that an organism located on an ex-
5tel Implantedl hard landing b 0.5 ternal surface or newly exposed will be im-
planted on hard landing
(Probability that a VTO on an external surface
6rel {VTOI vibration c 0.01 or newly exposed will survive release by vi-
bration
Trel VTO 'erosion; coveredl d 0.8 Probability that a VTO on a covered surface will
survive release by erosion
8rel IVTO erosion; mated d 0.01 Probability that a VTO on a mated surface will
survive release by erosion
9rel IVTOJ erosion; encapsulatedf d 0.0001 Probability that a VTO encapsulated in a solid
Smaterial will survive release by erosion
Output variables--expected number of VTOs released
in a viable state by each of three mechanisms:
10rel Implantation I 0.45 Implantation
llrel Erosion E 14.89 Erosion
12rel Vibration V 0.11 Vibration
Transport Submodel
State variables
Itra ISurvive transit P1 0.01 Probability that a VTO will survive transporta-
r1 tion by a Martian dust storm
Probability that a VTO will reach a microenvi-
2tra JFind water P6 0.005 ronment with usable water after transportation
by a dust storm
3tra Find lodgingI P4  0.5 Probability that a VTO will be lodged with UV
S4 shielding after transportation by a dust storm
4tra Iwater deposition P11  0.0005 Probability that water will be deposited on a
VTO lodged with shield during a dust storm cycle
SProbability that a VTO lodged with shield in a
5tra Swept aloft P12  0.5 dry location will be swept aloft by the next
dust storm
Probability that a VTO lodged with shield will
8. thI. by 0.0V r adiatI on
a dust storm cycle
Reproduction Submodel
State variables
Probability that an organism on the spacecraft
Facultative psychrophiles will be capable of surviving and reproducing in
irep and anaerobes 1 0.05 Martian microenvironments with usable water,
nutrients, and UV shielding (i.e., will be fac-
ultatively both psychrophilic and anaerobic)
Probability that the nutrients necessary to
2rep INutrientsl n 0.1 support microbial growth will be present in a
Martian microenvironment with usable water
A)] indicates the probability assigned to Event A.
t[AIB) indicates the probability assigned to Event A, given the occurrence of Event B.
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Table 2.2
COMTAMINATION MODEL: MARGINAL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Probability of
Contamination Model Variables Contamination
(Units are 10-6;
Values Nominal = 5.9)
Parameters Being Varied
Low Nominal High Low High
Bio-burden Submodel Variables
ibio External 2.2 11 55 5.0 10.7
2bio Covered 3.2 16 80 3.1 20.2
4bio Encapsulated 4,000 20,000 100,000 5.0 10.4
Release Submodel Variables
irel {Hard landing 0.0004 0.002 0.01 5.2 9.6
3rel Newly hard landing; 0.0001 0.001 0.01 5.4 10.9
exposed encapsulated
4rel jImplanted I soft landing 0.0001 0.001 0.01 5.7 g.7
6rel IVTO J vibrationf 0.001 0.01 0.1 5.4 11.1
9rel JVTO I erosion; encapsulated 0.00001 0.0001 0.001 5.4 10.9
Transport Submodel Variables
ltra ISurvive transit t (P1 ) 0.001 0.01 0.1 2.2 45.2
2tra lFind water t (P6 ) 0.0005 0.005 0.05 1.5 49.9
4tra lWater deposition (P1 1 ) 0.00005 0.0005 0.005 5.0 15.2
Reproduction Submodel Variables
1 Facultative psychrophiles 0.005 0.05 0.25 0.6 29.6
lrep (and anaerobes
2rep lNutrients 0.01 0.1 0.5 0.6 29.6
Low and high values of the probability of contamination correspond to the low and high values of the var:iables.
2.3.1 Bio-Burden Submodel Variables
Considering first the bio-burden variables, we can observe
that microbes on covered surfaces play a predominant role. An increase
of their population by a factor of 5 is reflected by an increase of the
probability of contamination by a factor of 3.5. The reason for this
large effect is that microbes on covered surfaces have a good chance of
being released in a viable state. They may be viewed as located in a
box, a corner of which is eroded away. A fraction of the interior sur-
face will be exposed to lethal UV radiation, but many microbes will
still be shielded from UV radiation prior to being swept out of the
box by Martian winds. Equally interesting to note is that microbes on
mated surfaces do not appear in the list of critical variables. In
fact, their contribution to the probability of contamination is only on
the order of 1 percent.
2.3.2 Release Submodel Variables
Several Release Submodel variables are important but none
seem to be highly critical. It is unlikely that receiving perfect in-
formation about any one variable could increase the probability of con-
tamination by more than a factor of 2.
2.3.3 Transport Submodel Variables
The probability of contamination is much more sensitive to
two characteristics of the transport submodel. Foremost is the proba-
bility of finding water on Mars. Several models have been proposed for
the existence of water in a form usable by terrestrial microorganisms.
See, for example, Refs. 20 and 21.
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The probability of the existence of these models and the fraction of
the Martia surface on which they might operate has been quaintifed.
-3
As a result, a probability of 5 X 10-3 has been assigned to the event
that an organism deposited at random on the Martian surface will find
usable water. A number 10 times smaller would reduce the probability
of contamination by a factor of 4, and a number 10 times larger would
multiply the risk of contamination by a factor of 8. Alternate mechanisms
have also been considered by which water might be deposited on VTOs lodged
in initially dry locations in the course of the 50-year quarantine period.
Almost equally important is the lethality of transportation
by Martian dust storms. As stated earlier, the majority of VTOs that
may cause contamination are released by aeolian erosion. They may be
swept aloft in a dust storm or simply saltate on the Martian surface.
In both cases they are exposed to high levels of UV radiation. In fact,
unless the microbe lives in a colony or is attached to a particle that
offers UV shielding, it should most certainly be killed after a few
minutes of exposure. We have assigned a probability of 0.01 to the event
that a microbe will find sufficient UV shielding to survive transporta-
tion by a dust storm. This value is supported by experimental results2 2
showing a two-order of magnitude decrease in populations of B. Cereus
and B. Subtilis airborne in simulated Martian dust clouds over a period
of weeks.
2.3.4 Reproduction Submodel Variables
Finally, the importance of the two variables of the Repro-
duction Submodel is clearly apparent. The two variables correspond to
two conditions that must be met if growth is to occur: (1) the microbe
must be resistant to the Martian environment, and (2) it iiiust find appro-
priate nutrients.
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Experimentation in microbiology laboratories could address
the question of whether different microorganisms surviving the dry heat
sterilization cycle could reproduce in a Martian microenvironment if
supplied with usable water and UV protection. Unfortunately, little
attention has been given to that problem until recently. Based on in-
formal discussions with several experts, a probability of 5 percent has
been assigned to reproduction under these conditions. However, further
information might very well decrease this number by one or two orders
of magnitude. Such a decrease would cause exactly the same relative
reduction of the risk of contamination. Likewise, a change in the
probability of finding nutrients, currently set at 10 percent, would
cause the same relative change in the probability of contamination.
2.4 Simplified Version of the Calculations
Section 3 contains the development of our assessment model for the
contamination of Mars and Section 4 is devoted to detailed sensitivity
analyses on the assumptions and parameters used in the model. As a con-
sequence we can show that the main results can be derived from a very
simplified model. We will describe this approximate approach here because
it brings into focus the major aspects of a very complex situation, but
it should be remembered that the analyses of Sections 3 and 4 were neces-
sary to draw this simple picture.
The approximate assessment of the risk of contamination can be per-
formed in two steps:
(1) Calculation of the number of VTOs released by each of
the three release mechanisms: implantation, erosion
and vibration.
(2) Estimation of the probability of growth following
these releases.
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The expected number of released VTOs is estimated as follows.
(1) The implantation mechanism operates essentially on VTOs
on external surfaces and encapsulated in solid materials.
The following breakdown shows three dominant possibilities
contributing to a total of 0.045 VTOs released by implan-
tation:
Number of Probability Other Release Expected Number of
VTOs per of Landing Parameters VTOs Released
Location Type X Mode X (see Table 2.1)= by Implantation
External Hard landing (5rel)
11 X 0.002 X 0.5 = 0.011
External Soft landing (4rel)
11 X 0.998 X 0.001 = 0.011
Encapsulated Hard landing (3rel)(5rel)
20,000 x 0.002 X 0.001 X 0.5 0.020
Others 0.003
Total 0.045
(2) The expected number of VTOs released by erosion is 14.89
and consists essentially of VTOs on covered surfaces and
encapsulated:
Erosion Type Probability Other Release Expected Number of
and Number of of Type of Parameters VTOs Released
VTOs Released X Landing X (see Table 2.1) = by Erosion
Covered Soft landing (7rel)
16 X 0.998 X 0.8 = 12.80
Encapsulated Soft landing (9rel)
20,000 X 0.998 X 0.0001 = 2.00
Other 0.09
Total 14.89
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(3) The vibration release mechanism contributes a total ex-
pected number of 0.11 VTOs. Practically all were located
on external surfaces and are released by vibration follow-
ing a soft landing:
Location Type Probability Other Release Expected Number of
and Number of of Type of Parameters VTOs Released
VTOs Released X Landing X (see Table 2.1) = by Vibration
External Soft landing (6rel)
11 X 0.998 X 0.01 0.11
Figure 2.3 is an approximate representation of the ways in which a
released VTO can be viably transported to a microenvironment with usable
water. (See Table 2.1 for an exact definition of the parameters.) The
numbers associated with each of the arrows indicate the probability that
the microbe will be viably transported from one state to another. Using
the probabilities expressed in Figure 2.3, we can make the following
calculations:
Probability of
an Organism
VTO Reaching Usable
Release Transport Variables Water in a
Mechanism (see Table 2.1) = Viable State
Implantation (2tra) + (3tra) X (2 X 4tra)
-3
0.005 + 0.5 X 0.001 5.5 X 10
Erosion (itra) X [(2tra) + (3tra) X (2 X 4tra)]
-5
0.01 X (0.005 + 0.5 X 0.001) 5.5 X 10
Vibration 2 X (4tra)
-3
0.001 1 X 10
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The total expected number of VTOs reaching water is therefore:
-3 -4
T-plantation A CZ X V I r% 2.5 10
-5 -4
Erosion 14.89 X 5.5 X 10 = 8.2 X 10
-3 -4
Vibration 0.11 X 10 = 1.1 X 10
-4
Total = 11.8 X 10
Each organism has a 5 percent chance of being resistant to the
Martian environment and a 10 percent chance of finding appropriate nu-
trients to grow and proliferate. The probability of contamination of
Mars is therefore:
-4 -6
11.8 X 10 X 0.05 x 0.1 = 6 X 10
LODGED
VIBRATION -- 0 WITH
SHIELD
2 x (4tra) = 0.001
REACHED
(3tra)= 05 USABLE
WATER
(2tra)= 0.005
IMPLANTATION SURVIVED
TRANSIT
(1tra) = 0.01
EROSION .m.. DUSTBORNE
FIGURE 2.3 APPROXIMATE VERSION OF THE TRANSPORT SUBMODEL
a.)
Approximate calculations have been carried out to evaluate the
-6
overall uncertainty associated with the 6 X 10 probability of contamina-
tion estimate. The results show a probability of a few percent that the
-4
constraint of 10 might be violated, and a probability of 50 percent
-6
that the probability of contamination would be revised to less than 10
on the basis of additional information.
2.5 Comparisons with the Woods Hole Assessment of P(G)
At a meeting in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, in July 1970, planetolo-
gists and microbiologists combined their expertise to estimate the proba-
bility of growth of a terrestrial microorganism deposited on the surface
of Mars. This probability of growth, P g was considered as the product
of three factors defined as follows:
P = the probability that there exist microenvironments (ME)
me
on Mars that would support growth of the most hardy
terrestrial organisms (HTO)
Phto = the probability that an HTO capable of growing in the
defined microenvironment exists among the organisms
present in and on the spacecraft
Pt = the probability that such an HTO on release from the
spacecraft will be transported to a microenvironment
and survive the trip.
Estimates for these three parameters were as follows: 1
Even-Odds 0.999 Confidence Factor--
Estimate Upper Limit Estimate
-2
P 1 X 10 1
me
-4 -2
P 3 X 10 1 X 10
hto
-3 -2P 1 X 10 1 X 10t
-9 -4
P 9 P " P * P 3 X 10 1 X 10
g me hto t
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-4
The conclusion was to recommend the value of P = 1 X 10 and to
point out at the same time the conservative nature of this estimate.
The following comparisons can be made with the parameters of our
model:
(1) The probability of existence of a suitable microenviron-
ment (Pme) is comparable to the probability of finding
water and nutrients, that is (5 X 10-3)(0.1) = 5 X 10-4
or 20 times less than the even-odds (median) estimate
of Pme'
(2) The probability that a VTO on the spacecraft will be
suited to the Martian microenvironment (Phto) should be
compared with our 5 percent assessment for the fraction
of psychrophiles and anaerobes. Partly because of a
difference in the definition of a suitable microenviron-
ment, the two assessments are quite different.
(3) The transport probability Pt is especially difficult to
compare with any one parameter in our model. For organisms
released by erosion we have adopted approximately 10-2,
but the probability of surviving transport is almost 1.0
for VTOs directly implanted in the ground.
As stated earlier, our estimates of the probabilities of growth
conditional on the release mechanisms are:
VTO Release
Method Probability of Growth
-5
Implantation 2.8 X 10
-7
Erosion 2.8 X 10
-6
Vibration 5.3 X 10
These are the numbers that should be compared with the Woods Hole
-4 -6
recommendation of 1 X 10 and the NASA specification of 10 for P .
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3 THE MODEL FOR ASSESSING THE
PROBABILITY OF CONTAMINATION OF MARS
The Mission Contamination Model is composed of four submodels, each
describing a necessary step in the contamination process:
* Bio-Burden by location on the spacecraft.
* Release of microbes into the Martian environment.
* Transport to a microenvironment in which the microbe can
find water in a form usable for reproduction.
* Reproduction by microbes in a hospitable water microenviron-
ment, given that necessary nutrients are available and that
the microbe is of a type suited to the conditions that pre-
vail in the microenvironment.
Communication between one submodel and the next is through the
expected number of VTOs reaching one stage and going on into the next
stage in the contamination process. The emergence of one or more VTOs
from the output of the reproduction model is considered contamination.
The probability of contamination can be taken to be the expected number
of VTOs in the output of the reproduction model since this number is
much smaller than unity.
We shall now discuss each submodel and the scientific knowledge that
each of them summarizes.
3.1 The Bio-Burden Submodel
The Viking bio-burden submodel is used to determine the expected
number of VTOs in each of four location types on the lander: external
surface, covered surface (the interior surface of a container), mated
surface (contact surface between two parts), and encapsulated in solid
materials. Figure 3.1 shows the inputs to this submodel.
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3.1.1 Bio-Burden Submodel Parameters
The first input is the expected number of VTOs on the space-
craft in each of the four locations prior to sterilization. A second
input is the sensitivity of various types of organisms to sterilization.
The third is the effect of the sterilization regime on microbial population.
The fourth input treats the possible recontamination after terminal
sterilization and the fifth input deals with in-flight increase or re-
duction of the bio-burden. As shown in Figure 3.1, the output of the
Bio-Burden Submodel is the expected number of VTOs found in each of the
four locations: external, covered, mated, and encapsulated.
The following major input parameters are described below:
(1) the sensitivity of microorganisms to dry heat sterilization, (2)
recontamination, (3) contamination of the bioexperiment, and (4) increase
or decrease of the microbe population during flight.
Expected Number
of Microbes
by Location
PRESTERILIZATION
BI0-BURDEN
BY LOCATION EXTERNAL
SENSITIVITY TO
STERILIZATION
COVERED
STERILIZATION BIO-BURDEN
REGIME SUBMODEL
MATED
RECONTAMINATION
ENCAPSULATED
IN-FLIGHT
GROWTH
FIGURE 3.1 THE BIO-BURDEN SUBMODEL
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3.1.1.1 Sensitivity of Microorganisms to Dry
Heat Sterilization
23 24 25
Empirical evidence 23 2 suggests that the reduc-
tion in microbe population over time during dry heat sterilization can
be characterized by a curve like that shown in Figure 3.2. The abscissa
represents time on a linear scale, and the ordinate represents the
number of spores plotted on a log scale. (The numbers in Figure 3.2 are
illustrative only and are not intended to be an accurate representation
of empirical results.) A linear fit to the curve in Figure 3.2 has
generally been employed as an approximation:
-t/D
N = N X 10
1 o
where:
N = initial population
0
N 1 = poststerilization population
t = sterilization time
D-value = the time required for 1 order of magnitude reduction
in microbe population.
Recent evidence has indicated that the "fit" may
be poor; a small subpopulation of the organisms has been found to be
much more resistant to dry heat sterilization. Thus, it has been
suggested2 6 that a piecewise linear fit be made to the asymptotes of
this curve. Using this piecewise linear approximation, we arrive at
two exponential functions that characterize population reduction over
time from the heat sterilization. The time required for 1 order of
magnitude reduction in microbe population at a given temperature is
termed "D-value" (decimal reduction time). Denoting by primes and
double primes the normal and hardy subpopulations, we arrive at the
following relationship between the initial population No and the population
N of viable organisms after a sterilization time t:
141
106
APPROXIMATION
Fixed D value for "normal"
organisms
S105 Fixed D value for "hardy"
-10 subpopulation
CL
0
O
S102
0 5 10 15 20
TIME
FIGURE 3.2 DECREASE IN MICROBE POPULATION WITH DRY HEAT
STERILIZATION TIME
N = N' 1 0  + N" 1 0  , (3.1)1 o o
with
N = N' + N"
The nominal (normal subpopulation) D-values now
being used for Project Viking8 '2 7 are 0.5 hour for external and covered
organisms, 1 hour for mated organisms, and 5 hours for encapsulated
organisms at 1250 C. However, since the current sterilization regime
specifies approximately 1130C for 30 hours, new D-values must be computed
for each of the surfaces. D-values vary exponentially as a function of
temperature. The exponential rate of change is usually referred to as
8 28
the Z-value. The number currently used for this Z-value > is 1 order
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of magnitude increase in D-value per 210C decrease in sterilization
temperature. The equation:
(125-133)/21
D = D 10 (3.2)
113 125
is used to compute D-values for the 113 0 C regime. The "D-Value" column
in Table 3.1 gives the current D-values for both the normal and the hardy
organisms (normal on the left; hardy on the right).
Table 3.1 also contains the current numbers for
the pre- and post-sterilization bio-burdens with the number of normal
organisms given on the left and hardy organisms given on the right for
each location. The number of hardy organisms is computed by multiplying
the nominal bio-burden by 0.0025.29 The third column of numbers is
computed using Eq. (3.1) with the appropriate D-values from Column 2.
Note that for external, covered. and mated organisms the computed post-
sterilization bio-burden is exceedingly low. However, the number of hardy
organisms is in the range of 1 to 10. For the encapsulated organisms,
the poststerilization bio-burden of nominal microbes is at least an
order of magnitude greater than that for hardy organisms. The fourth
column gives the Project Viking estimate of the bio-burden at each of
the four locations. There are several inconsistencies between the esti-
mates and our calculations of the burden. However, based on the computed
numbers, the Project Viking estimates can be considered conservative; as
best we can determine, they overstate the expected population.
The encapsulated burden was extrapolated from experi-
ments in which plastics or ceramics similar to those used on the lander
were ground up and then assayed to determine bio-burden. The extra-
polation resulted in an expected microbe density of 130 organisms per
cubic centimeter. It will be shown that variations of that number
could have a significant impact on the probability of contamination.
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Table 3.1
BIO-BURDEN SUBMODEL PARAMETERS
1 2 3 4
Presterilization Poststerilization
Microbe Population D-Value Microbe Population§ Project Viking
Microbe Estimates of
* t
Location Normal Hardy Normal Hardy Normal Hardy Overall Population
External 6 .8 X 104  170 1.95 hr 25 hr 2.8 X 10- l l  10.7 11
4 -11
Covered 4.3 X 10 107.5 1.95 hr 25 hr 1.7 X 10 6.8 16
-6
Mated 460 1.1 3.85 hr Infinity 7.42 X 10 1.1 9
Encapsulated 94,000 235 16.26 hr Infinity 2,603 235 201000
Note: Sterilization regime is 1130C for 30 hours.27
Reference 19.
0.25 percent of normal microbe population.
tReference 27.
Computed from Columns 1 and 2 using Eq. (3.1).
Spacecraft volume times average density of 130 spores/cc.27
3.1.1.2 Recontamination
The recontamination issue can be modeled at several
levels of detail. As a first approximation, we considered external
surfaces only and represent recontamination uncertainty by the probability
node in Figure 3.3. Since the lander is encased in the bioshield during
27
and after the terminal heat sterilization process, the most likely
recontamination mode is a breach of the bioshield seal and subsequent
entry into the bioshield by airborne organisms. For discussion purposes
-3
we have assigned a probability of 10 to this event, with an outcome of
100 additional organisms contaminating the external locations as the
result of the recontamination event. The expected value of the probabil-
ity node in Figure 3.3 is then 11.1 organisms in external locations.
Given these numbers, recontamination does not constitute significant
increase in the bio-burden.
NUMBER OF VTOs
RECONTAMINATION ON EXTERNAL LOCATIONS
0.001
100
EXPECTED
VTOs
11.1
NO RECONTAMINATION
0.999
FIGURE 3.3 EFFECT OF RECONTAMINATION ON EXPECTED BIO-BURDEN
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3.1.1.3 Contamination of the Bioexperiment
Contamination of the bioexperiment nutrient has
30
also been cited 27 as an issue of concern. If an organism were to
penetrate the seal on the nutrient container or were located on the path
of the nutrient during the conduct of bioexperiments, it is likely that
extensive proliferation would occur. However, the probability of this
-6 el
event is currently constrained to be less than 10 . Given the location
of the nutrient in sealed glass ampoules enclosed in a steel container
and the limited interior surfaces that will be in contact with the nutrient
during the bioexperiment, it is generally believed that the probability
-6
of nutrient contamination is much lower than 10 , although some estimates
-5 32
have been as high as 10 . Note that this event would also affect the
validity of the data returned from the bioexperiment on Mars. However,
contamination of the bioexperiment, if it occurs, will probably be caused
by a single terrestrial microorganism and will therefore result in the
formation of a pure culture.3 1  Martian organisms, if they exist, are
likely to form a mixed culture. At least one of the bioexperiments on
the spacecraft should be able to differentiate between pure and mixed
cultures.
Assuming that the mission will not be flown unless
-6
the 10 constraint is met, the total risk of planetary contamination
as a result of bioexperiment contamination is negligible compared with
other sources of planetary contamination. As will be shown in Subsection
3.4, 1 chance in 20 is assigned to the event that the species that would
cause contamination of the nutrient will be adapted to survive and grow
in the Martian environment. The risk of contamination of Mars by VTOs
proliferating in the bioexperiment box is therefore bound to be less
-8
than 1 This is a cas where the assumptions implied in the
Sagan-Coleman formula do not apply, but numerically the contribution
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from bioexperiment contamination is negligible compared with the overall
contamination probability.
3.1.1.4 Increase or Decrease of Microbe Population
During Flight
Finally, we consider the in-flight increase or re-
duction in the number of organisms. From discussions with Mr. E. Bacon
at Exotech, we understand that NASA planning has assumed that neither
proliferation nor reduction in load will occur during transit. Strict
control on the organic material aboard the Viking lander and shielding
of the lander by the aeroshell up to the descent phase make these assump-
tions reasonable.
3.1.2 Bio-Burden Submodel Summary
In summary, we have used Project Viking estimates of bio-
burden profile for the output of the Bio-Burden Submodel. The numbers,
by location, are given in Column 4 of Table 3.1. Given the current
estimates, neither recontamination nor contamination of the bioexperiment
is a critical issue, but we recommend that attention be given to these
estimates as the project evolves and the terminal sterilization plan is
reviewed.
3.2 The Release Submodel
The Release Submodel is used to represent the processes by which
VTOs aboard the spacecraft are viably released into the Martian environ-
ment.
3.2.1 Release Submodel Parameters
The important input and output parameters for the Release
Submodel are represented in Figure 3.4. The main input variable is the
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Expected Number of
VTOs Released by
BIO-BURDEN
BY LOCATION
IMPLANTATION
EROSION
PROBABILITY OF RELEASE E
HARD LANDING AND SUBMODEL
FRACTURING RATIOS
VIBRATION
LETHALITY
OF RELEASE
MECHANISM
FIGURE 3.4 THE RELEASE SUBMODEL
bio-burden profile from the Bio-Burden Submodel. The Release Submodel
treats uncertainty in landing mode, fracturing on hard impact, aeolian
erosion as a release mechanism, and lethality of erosion and other
release mechanisms.
The overall output from the model is the expected number of
organisms released by erosion, implantation, or vibration. Implanted
organisms are externally located microbes that make direct contact with
the ground on impact. These spores have the distinct advantage of avoid-
ing the lethal UV flux in transit to a possible liquid water micro-
environment. Microbes on landing pads or on the parachute, or microbes
buried in dust after a hard landing are examples of implanted organisms.
We assume the lander geometry is such that it will not be the focus for
formation of a dune that 1would eventually cover it and implant all
organisms still on board. If the spacecraft were covered by a dune,
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aeolian erosion would be prevented and only external organisms could be
released, thus reducing the expected number of released VTOs.
Erosion releases are defined to occur only during local
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or global dust storms. Sagan suggests that the lander materials
could be eroded to depths of centimeters during the 50-year quarantine
period. Therefore, we shall assume all encapsulated organisms will be
released by erosion.
The third output is the number of organisms released by
vibration. This mechanism is defined to pertain only to external microbes,
although these include organisms originally not in external locations
but newly exposed to the environment by material fracturing after a
hard landing. This category is loosely an "all other" class, with
releases of the following kinds included: microbes falling off on
impact; microbes blown off by winds; organisms shaken off by the lander's
operational dynamics and vibration and by thermal effects.
However, the VTOs released in this situation would be implanted. We
might ask if the assumption of no dune formation could be a sensitive
assumption. If a dune were to form over the spacecraft, we might
expect all VTOs on external surfaces to be implanted.
Suppose we assume a 1 percent chance of dune formation. Since presum-
ably the external surfaces of the spacecraft are exposed to UV radiation
for many days prior to the dune formation, we assume some mortality
for nonshielded microbes. For example, we might assume that only 5
percent are still viable after several days exposure. Assuming an
expected 11 VTOs located on the external surface of the spacecraft, the
contribution of potential dune formation is then 11 X 0.01 X 0.05 =
0.006, an increase of 13 percent in the expected number of organisms
implanted. The effect on the overall probability of contamination
would be an increase of 3 percent. Even if dune formation were certain,
it would lead to an expected 0.6 VTOs implanted, which gives a con-
tribution to the probability of contamination of about 1.5 X 10- 5 . But
in this situation the contribution from erosion release would be negli-
gible. In summary, we do not regard dune formation as a sensitive
issue.
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3.2.2 Release Submodel Structure
Figure 3.5 is a tree representation of the various events
pertaining to the release mechanism. The input bio-burden is introduced
at the base of the tree (left) and is divided at any node among the
successor nodes in proportion to the probability assigned to each branch.
This is accomplished by simply multiplying the bioload at a node by the
probability on one of its branches and assigning the product to the suc-
cessor node at the end of that branch. When this is repeated for all
nodes and branches in the tree, we are left with the total bio-burden
input fractionated among 27 terminal nodes at the right of the tree.
As described above, the output from the Release Submodel is
the expected number of VTOs released by each of three mechanisms: implan-
tation, erosion. and vibration. To obtain these numbers, consider the
terminal nodes at the right of the tree. Each of these nodes corres-
ponds to either viable or nonviable organisms. Furthermore, each ter-
minal node is linked to the base of the tree by a unique path and there-
fore,. as we shall show below, corresponds to a specific release mechanism.
Thus,. it is a simple matter to identify terminal nodes corresponding to
viable organisms, to sort them according to the release mechanisms, and
to sum their contributions to obtain the expected number of VTOs released
by each of the three mechanisms.
To acquaint the reader with the primary state variables in
the Release Submodel tree, we will describe the four node levels shown
in Figure 3.5. The names of the node levels are shown at the top of
that drawing.
The first set of nodes represents the location of the microbes.
This information is the output bio-burden profile from the Bio-Burden
Submodel: the expected number of VTOs in external, covered, mated, and
encapsulated locations. The second set of nodes in the model refers to
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MICROBE LANDING RELEASE VIABILITY
LOCATION MODE MECHANISM
Implantation (1)1 VTO
Hard (H) VTO
Vibration (V)
Non-VTO
EXTERNAL
VVi oVTO
VTO
Implantation VTO
Soft (S)
VTO
Vibration (V)
Non-VTO
I VTO
VTO
H V
Non-VTO
VTO
COVERED Erosion (E)
Non-VTO
VTO
S Erosion
SNon-VTO
I VTO
VTO
H V
Non-VTOVTO
MATED E
Non-VTO
VTO
Non-VTO
I VTO
VTO
Non-VTO
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ENCAPSULATED E
Non-VTO
VTO
S E
Non-VTO
FIGURE 3.5 TREE STRUCTURE FOR VTO RELEASE
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the landing mode of the capsule. Two landing modes are represented:
hard and soft (nominai). The third set of nodes characterizes the
release mechanisms described above. The fourth set of nodes concerns
the viability of the organism after release. A major consideration here
is whether the release process (aeolian erosion, for instance) is lethal
to the organisms. The expected numbers of VTOs released by each of the
three release mechanisms are the state variables passed to the Transport
Submodel.
We shall now look more closely at each of the nodes. The
first four branches in the tree characterize the location of the bio-
burden. Associated with each of these branches is the expected number
of organisms in each location.
The probability of a hard landing is independent of the
location of microorganisms on the lander. In this submodel we have
taken as representative of a hard landing an impact having mean velocity
of 1,000 feet per second, as might result from a malfunction of the
vernier engine. The probability assigned to a hard landing is 0.002.34
At this impact velocity we can expect rupture and deformation, but we
would not expect extensive fragmentation or powdering of the lander
materials.35  Assumptions about this impact velocity strongly influence
the modeling of subsequent release mechanisms. One additional assumption
is that all microorganisms that are still viable immediately preceding
the impact will not be killed by a hard landing. This is supported by
work performed by the Boeing Company, in which the lethality of impacts
below 1,500 feet per second was nil.
3 6
As shown at the top of Figure 3.5, after "Landing Mode" we
consider the "Release Mechanism." For the covered, mated, and encapsulated
branches, the tree structure and release mechanisms are the same, although
the branches have different fractions. To describe the structure we pick
a trajectory through the tree beginning with a mated location microbe.
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Again, the structure is the same for covered or encapsulated organisms.
After a hard landing a fraction of those organisms that were formerly
in a mated location can be considered to be on an exposed surface, owing
to fracturing of the lander. We will refer to this fraction of micro-
organisms as that fraction newly exposed (f ) by the hard landing. Of
ne
these newly exposed organisms, some, just as on the external branch, are
implanted during impact and others are released by vibration. The re-
maining "unexposed" fraction of the organisms (1 - f ) is subjected
ne
to the aeolian erosion process like the mated organisms after a soft
landing. As can be seen in Figure 3.5, there is a certain lethality
associated with both the vibration release mode and the erosion process.
The odds of a surface microbe being released by implantation
rather than by vibration are influenced by the landing mode. In the
nominal soft landing mode, only the viable microbes on the bottom of
the landing pads will be implanted. However, on a hard impact of
1,000 feet/sec and subsequent break-up of the craft, most pieces of the
lander will be on the surface or partially buried. Thus a much greater
fraction of the newly exposed organisms will be implanted. As stated
before, we are not formally including in our analysis the formation of
a dune over the spacecraft.
To compute the number of organisms released that were
initially on a mated surface, conditional on a hard landing, we need
to know four separate parameters:
(1) the fraction of microorganisms newly exposed
f (mated).
ne
(2) the portion of newly exposed organisms that are
implanted.
(3) the fraction of organisms that survive vibration
release.
(4) the lethality of the aeolian erosion mechanism.
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As stated before, the structure described for the mated
surfaqs is identical for covered and encapsulated microorganisms. The
table in Figure 3.6 contains values for these parameters for each of the
four locations. The table also shows the tree structure for the covered,
mated, and encapsulated branches. The computation of branch fraction
from the table is demonstrated symbolically on the tree below the table.
Figure 3.7 shows the assignment of branch probabilities to
the Release Submodel. A detailed description of each assignment is given
in Appendix B.
3.2.3 Release Submodel Summary
Depending on the release mechanism, the organisms may be
subjected to a variety of transport processes before they reach a hospit-
able microenvironment. The contributions of each release mechanism will
therefore have a specific impact on the probability of contamination.
The Transport Submodel presented in Section 3.4 will show that organisms
released by implantation have about 100 times as much chance of growth
as organisms released by erosion and 5 times as much chance as organisms
released by vibration.
With this information in mind, the number of VTOs released
by each of the three mechanisms should be reviewed. Calculations from
Figure 3.7 show that:
(1) The implanation mechanism operates essentially on
VTOs on external surfaces and encapsulated in
solid materials. The following breakdown shows
three dominant possibilities contributing to a
total of 0.045 VTOs released by implantation.
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LOCATION ne
newly exposed fne Implanted surviving surviving
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FIGURE 3.6 RELEASE SUBMODEL PARAMETERS
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56
Number of Probability Other Release Expected Number of
VTOs per of Landing Parameters VTOs Released
Location Type X Mode X (see Table 2.1) by Implantation
External Hard landing (5rel)
11 X 0.002 X 0.5 = 0.011
External Soft landing (4rel)
11 X 0.998 X 0.001 = 0.011
Encapsulated Hard landing (3rel)(5rel)
20,000 x 0.002 X 0.001 x 0.5 = 0.020
Others 0.003
Total 0.045
(2) The expected number of VTOs released by erosion is
14.89 and consists essentially of VTOs on covered
surfaces and encapsulated.
Erosion Type Probability Other Release Expected Number of
and Number of of Type of Parameters VTOs Released
VTOs Released X Landing X (see Table 2.1) = by Erosion
Covered Soft landing (7rel),
16 X 0.998 X 0.8 = 12.80
Encapsulated Soft landing (9rel)
20,000 X 0.998 X 0.0001 = 2.00
Other 0.09
Total 14.89
(3) The vibration release mechanism contributes a total
expected number of 0.11 VTOs. Practically all
were located on external surfaces and are released
by vibration following a soft landing.
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Location Type Probability Other Release Expected Number of
and Number of of Type of Parameters VTOs Released
VTOs Released X Landing X (see Table 2.1) = by Vibration
External Soft landing (6rel)
11 X 0.998 X 0.01 5 0.11
Table 3.2 presents the output of the Release Submodel in the
form of a Release Submodel matrix. Each element of the matrix represents
the probability that a microbe in a given location will be released by a
specific release mechanism.
The most important elements are marked by asterisks. It is
also clear from this table that organisms on mated surfaces play a negli-
gible role.
Table 3.2
RELEASE SUBMODEL MATRIX: PROBABILITY THAT A SINGLE VTO
IN EACH LOCATION WILL BE RELEASED BY EACH MECHANISM
Expected Number of VTOs in Each Location
Expected Number of
VTOs Released by Each External Covered Mated Encapsulated
Mechanism 11 16 9 20, 000
Implantation * *
3 -4 -4 -6
0.045 2 X10 10 10 10
Erosion
* -4
14.89 O 0.8 0.01 10
Vibrating *
-2 -7 -7 -9
0.01 10 10 10 10
Most important elements.
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3.3 The Transport Submodel
If a viable microbe has been released, it must reach a hospitable
environment in order to proliferate and cause contamination. Several
questions arise: If there is no water where the microbe first contacts
the planet, how does it move to other water sources? Is the available
water "usable" by the microbe? What is the microbe's resistance to
the hostile UV radiation? If resistance is low, does the microbe survive
because of shielding from UV radiation?
These questions are addressed in the Transport Submodel, as shown
in Figure 3.8. The primary transport mechanism is Martian winds. The
microbe, depending on its size and attachment to other particles, is
either carried aloft like dust or caught in a saltationt process at
the surface. The model will produce as an output the expected number
of organisms reaching a source of usable water.
3.3.1 Markovian Models
We have chosen a Markov model to represent the dynamics
and uncertainty of transport on the Martian surface. Crucial to the
use of the Markov representation is the concept of a state, which we
shall explain briefly by paraphrasing the text of R. A. Howard.37
Terrestrial organisms do not necessarily require liquid water. Some
organisms are known to live on water vapor (with sufficiently high
partial pressure), or on ice at temperatures greater than -100 C, or
on water contained in nutrients.
tSaltation refers to the movement of sand particles near the surface
in a storm. Bouncing or leapfrog trajectories are followed by ,the
relatively heavy sand particles.
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FIGURE 3.8 THE TRANSPORT SUBMODEL
The "situation" of a microbe on the Martian surface can be
specified by giving the value of several variables that describe the
microbe relative to the transport system. These variables are called
state variables, and they answer questions like: Is the microbe alive
or dead? Has it been released from the lander? Is it aloft and being
blown by the winds or is it lodged in sand? Is it shielded from UV
radiation? Is it in a water microenvironment?
As surface dust storms come and go, the state description
of the microbe is likely to change. Since Martian dust storms provide
the most probable means of transport from the lander to usable water,
it is very important that our model of transport represent the dynamic
effects of the local or global dust storms.
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3.3.1.1 A Three-State Model
As a very simple model, consider the state descrip-
tions shown in Figure 3.9. There is only one state variable: the physical
location of the microbe. The values that variable can have are: (1) on
the lander, (2) in transit, or (3) lodged in dust. Thus, this simple
model includes a provision for the dynamics of dust storms. Also, the
three states are mutually exclusive--a property that will be discussed
later.
Assume the microbe is released from the lander by
the first local dust storm. According to the model in Figure 3.9, it
then makes the transition from the "Microbe on Lander" state to the
"Microbe in Transit" state. This transition is indicated by the one-
way arrow in the drawing. Associated with this transition is the local
dust storm event. As the storm dies, we can imagine that the microbe
falls to the ground and becomes lodged in an accumulation of dust. Hence,
Occurrence End of
of Dust Dust
MICROBE Storm MICROBE Storm MICROBE
ON IN I LODGED
LANDER TRANSIT IN DUST
EVENT:
Occurrence
of Dust
Storm
FIGURE 3.9 THREE-STATE REPRESENTATION OF MICROBIAL TRANSPORT
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the transition to the third state, with the end of the storm as the
associated event. Notice that the transitions are caused by the occur-
rence of events and are not related to the passage of set periods of
time.
With the onslaught of the next dust storm, the
microbe makes the loop transition: it reenters the "Microbe in Transit"
state. Thus the process continues for as long as there are dust storms
to provide a transport mechanism.
3.3.1.2 A Five-State Model
The three-state model can be enhanced by including
a provision for the death or permanent immobilization of the microbe.
This will be especially useful in the context of planetary quarantine
because once a microbe enters the "Nonviable" state we no longer are
concerned with it. Figure 3.10 shows the nonviable state and includes
a state representing the microbe in a usable water microenvironment. In
the latter state the organism is assumed to be no longer "available" for
transport. In fact, the microorganisms that reach usable water will be
the output state variable for the entire Transport Submodel. Note that
once a microbe has entered either of these new states, it can never
leave. These are therefore called "trapping states" and are indicated
in the figure by circles drawn with bold lines. These two states are
mutually exclusive since all dead organisms are in the nonviable state.
The transition process has now been complicated
by the addition of several arrows emanating from the "Lodged in Dust"
state. These arrows correspond to the physical situation where some
of the lodged organisms are actually in a usable water microenvironment.
Others are lodged but dead, probably as a result of soil abrasion in
the storm, or UV radiation while left on the ground after the storm, or
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FIGURE 3.10 FIVE-STATE REPRESENTATION OF MICROBIAL TRANSPORT
other causes such as the freeze-thaw cycle. The remaining microbes are
not permanently lodged and may be put in transit by another dust storm.
To specify the fraction of lodged organisms that
are in a microenvironment with water and the fraction that are nonviable,
we assign probabilities PH and PN. Thus, an organism that is lodged at
the end of a storm has a probability (P ) that it will be in water and
a probability (PN) that it will be lodged but nonviable. The probability
that the microbe will not be available for transport by the next dust
storm is (P + P .. Tn other words, the nprohnbbhility that the microbeSH N -W - - - I..
will be put into the "In Transit" state by the next dust storm is:
P = 1.0 - (P + P )
L H N
This result is correct only if the states are mutually exclusive.
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One more point relative to the five-state model in
Figure 3.10 deserves to be mentioned. The transitions from "Lodged in
Dust" to "In Usable H 0" or "Nonviable" are not necessarily caused by
the same events that cause transition from "In Transit" to "Lodged in
Dust." In fact, the transitions to either of the trapping states could
occur any time between the end of one dust storm and the beginning of
the next. These transitions do not affect the event-based dynamics of
the three-state model as long as we carefully define the time period
in which each transition can occur.
Figure 3.11 defines the time periods by introducing
one final new term: the dust storm cycle. Since the dynamic transport
process is based on dust storm events, this cycle will take on special
significance. Passage of one cycle indicates not only that a dust
storm has started and ended, but also that the opportunity for making
any of the transitions in the model has occurred only once. This will
be very useful when determining the fraction of organisms that have
reached water after the first dust storm following their release from
the spacecraft. To be precise, one cycle includes the period from the
beginning of one storm to the beginning of the next.
3.3.2 The Transport Submodel: A Six-State Markov Model
Despite the addition of a time frame, the five-state model
is still lacking in that it does not allow the possibility of an organism
becoming Nonviable while "In Transit." Also, it does not distinguish
between the inputs from the three release mechanisms discussed earlier.
This situation can be remedied as shown in Figure 3.12.
The "In Transit" state is replaced by two new states: "Dustborne" and
"Survived Transit." A microbe in the "Dustborne" state will not neces-
sarily reach the "Survived Transit" state but may become "Nonviable."
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FIGURE 3.11 FIVE-STATE REPRESENTATION OF DUST STORM CYCLE
p9
P 8REACHED
USAB LEP13 4 WATER
SURVIVED SURVIVED
LODGING VTOs TRANSIT
RELEASED BY
IMPLANTATION P
P2,3
VTOs RELEASED
BY EROSION
Q Transient State
Holding State
O Trapping State
Pi's refer to transition probabilities between states. See Section 3.3.3.
FIGURE 3.12 TRANSPORT MARKOV MODEL
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Likewise, VTOs having "Survived Transit" can become "Nonviable" when
the dust storm subsides because of a lack of shielding from UV radiation.
The old state "Lodged in Dust" now refers only to the VTOs that survive
transit and find sufficient protection from UV radiation when they are
dropped by the dust storm, and is therefore renamed "Lodged with Shield."
The old "On Lander" state is replaced by three arrows (m)
pointing to the three states, "Dustborne," "Survived Transit," and "Lodged
with Shield," where VTOs can enter the transport process, as will be
explained shortly.
Finally, the Transport Submodel must reflect the dependence
of transport mechanisms on the occurrence of dust storms. At the end of
a dust storm, VTOs may be in one of the two trapping states, "Reached
Usable Water" and "Nonviable," or "Lodged with Shield," waiting for the
onslaught of the next storm. However, we want to recognize the fact
that water might be deposited on a VTO lodged with shield or that the
organism might reach water by an alternate transport mechanism before
the beginning of the next storm. A VTO might also be killed while lodged
with shield by environmental conditions other than the UV radiations
(for example, by the diurnal freeze-thaw cycle). For these reasons, a
VTO can make a transition out of the "Lodged with Shield" state before
the occurrence of a new dust storm. To indicate when a VTO might be
picked up by a new dust storm, we therefore define a sixth state, "Sur-
vived Lodging," corresponding to VTOs that between two storms remain
lodged in vhiable state but without access to usable water. This is
in effect a "holding" state, which is represented in Figure 3.10 by a
double circle.
Similar to Figure 3.11, Figure 3.13 shows the dust storm
cycle and the time periods in which transitions may occur. Note
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2. Death by UV Radiation
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12. Picked up by the New Storm
13. Stays Lodged
ONE CYCLE NEXT CYCLE
TIME
FIGURE 3.13 TRANSPORT MARKOV MODEL-DUST STORM CYCLE
in Figure 3.13 that the two transitions out of "Survived Lodging"
(Transitions 12 and 13) are the only two that occur at the beginning of
the cycle.
A last point must be discussed concerning the use of a
Markov model. Theoretically, a Markov model imposes a constraint on
all transition probabilities: "Only the last state occupied by the
process is relevant in determining its future behavior. 7  This means
that, for instance, transition probability P in Figure 3.12 cannot be
dependent on whether the state occupied before "Lodged with Shield" was
"Survived Lodging" or "Survived Transit." Although we feel this assump-
tion is justifiable, its adoption will be shown to be an almost moot
point because most of the released organisms either will be killed or
will reach a usable water environment during the first cycle--a major
conclusion to be amplified later.
3.3.3 Transport Submodel Parameters
A brief summary of characteristics of the Transport Submodel
is given below. It includes definitions of the six states in the sub-
model, descriptions of the transitions between states. and identification
of the states in which released microbes enter the Transport Submodel.
More complete descriptions and quantitative assessments of the parameters
are given in Appendix C.
3.3.3.1 Definitions of the Six States
The six transport states of microorganisms are as
follows:
Dustborne--All viable organisms involved in the aeolian erosion
process. They might be aloft or saltating near the surface.
Survived transit--All VTOs surviving transportation at the end
of a dust storm.
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Lodged with shield--Microbes that are lodged with sufficient
shielding to survive UV radiations between dust storms.
Survived lodging--All VTOs in dry locations but not permanently
lodged or dead at the beginning of a dust storm cycle (a holding
state).
Nonviable--All organisms that are dead, permanently lodged in
a dry environment, or otherwise incapable of reproduction (a
trapping state).
Reached usable water--All VTOs that have reached usable water
or are lodged in a spot where water will develop for sufficient
periods of time to allow reproduction (a trapping state).
3.3.3.2 Transition Descriptions and Probabilities
Figure 3.14 shows the probability assignments for
each transition, which are based on discussions with experts. (Appendix
C provides a detailed description of each of these transitions and
probability assignments.) The brief summary supplied here should be
sufficient for the reader to interpret Figure 3.14. The transitions are
described in the order that they are numbered in Figure 3.13; the prob-
ability assignments are shown in parentheses.
Survive transit (10-2)--This transition is taken if the microbe
survives the soil abrasion and attenuated UV radiation that
is characteristic of dust storms 22 (tra).
Death by UV radiation (0.99)1 The complement of Transition 1.
Death by soil abrasion (N0)
Find lodging with shield (0.5)--The microbe must find UV
shielding to survive at the end of a dust storm (3tra).
Permanently lodged (,0)--If a VTO becomes unavailable to the
transport process and is not in water, we consider it non-
viable.
-3
Find water (5 x 10 )--We consider two primary water existence
39
mechanisms: one proposed by C. B. Farmer and one by A. P.
Ingersoll 4 0 [See Table C.4 in Appendix C (2tra)].
Death, given transport survival (0.495)--The primary cause here
is inability of a VTO to find lodging with UV shield after the
storm.
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FIGURE 3.14 TRANSPORT MARKOV MODEL: PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENTS
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-3
Death while lodged (10 )--Nonviability caused by temperature
cycling or other environmental hazards, with the exception of
UV radiations (6tra).
Survive lodging (0.9985)--The complement of Transitions 8, 10
and 11.
-6
Alternate transport mechanism (5 X 10 )--A means to reach
water by other than storm transport during one dust storm
cycle: vibration, earthquakes, and the like.
-4
Water deposition on organism (5 X 10 )--A rare event, covering
all water encounters during one dust storm cycle not treated
by Transitions 6 and 10 (4tra). Note that because of the 50/50
chance of a microbe staying lodged during a dust storm
(Transition 13), Transitions 10 and 11 correspond to probabilities
of 10- 5 and 10-3, respectively, during the 50-year quarantine
period.
Swept aloft by a new storm (0.5)--Microbes "swept" into tran-
sit by a new storm cycle (5tra).
Stay lodged (0.5)--Microbes not picked up by the next new
storm but potentially available for transport at a later
period.
3.3.3.3 Microbe Starting States
Recall that the release model provides the expected
number of VTOs released by three separate mechanisms: erosion, implan-
tation, and vibration. This information is necessary to determine the
starting state of the VTO population entering the transport process.
Clearly, microbes released by aeolian erosion start in the "Dustborne"
state, as shown in Figure 3.14.
Consider now the implanted organisms that were
placed in contact with the ground during landing. We can assume they
are shielded from UV flux and are able to find water with the same
probability as an organism just deposited (shielded) at a random spot
by a storm. We therefore make the assumption that implanted microbes
begin in the "Survive Transit" state.
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Finally, we must assign a starting state to organisms
released from external locations by vibration. This release is expected
to occur during nonstorm periods, a time when the UV flux tends to reach
its maximum. Since these organisms are released in a viable condition,
we assume they are in some way shielded from the lethal UV flux and we
start them in the "Lodged with Shield" state.
3.3.4 Transport Submodel Results and Sensitivity Analysis
A direct inspection of the Transport Submodel described in
Figure 3.15 reveals the major properties of the transport process and
the critical variables. These results will then be confirmed and made
more nearly precise by applying standard Markov process analysis tech-
niques.
3.3.4.1 Direct Inspection of the Transport Submodel
Consider transport of a VTO during the first dust
storm cycle following its release. Figure 3.15 indicates the probability
that a VTO will occupy each of the states en route to water after one
cycle. The tables next to each state identify the origin of the VTO:
I = implantation, E = erosion, and V = vibration.
For example, a VTO released by erosion will enter
the "Dustborne" state and will survive transit with probability 0.01.
After the storm dies out, that VTO may be deposited in a microenvironment
with iusable water with probability 0.005 or may reach water by some
other means after being lodged with shield with probability 0.5 X 0.0005
-4
= 2.5 X 10 . The total probability that an organism released by ero-
sion will reach usable water in a viable state at the end of the first
dust storm cycle is therefore:
-4 -5
0.01 X (0.005 + 2.5 X 10- 4 ) = 5.2 5 X 10-5
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FIGURE 3.15 TRANSPORT SUBMODEL SHOWING THE PROBABILITY THAT A VTO WILL
OCCUPY EACH STATE OF THE TRANSPORT SUBMODEL DURING THE
COURSE OF ONE DUST STORM CYCLE
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A similar reasoning shows that the probabilities
that VTOs released by implantation or vibration will reach microenviron-
ments with usable water during the first cycle following their release
-3 -4
are 5.25 X 10 and 5 X 10 , respectively.
At the end of the first cycle following their re-
lease, VTOs that have not reached one of the two trapping states, "Reached
Usable Water" or "Nonviable," are held in the "Survived Lodging" state
until the beginning of the next dust storm.
During the new cycle those VTOs have equal chances
of staying lodged and of being blown off by the new storm. In the
latter case they will be exposed to dangerous UV radiations and their
population will be reduced by two orders of magnitude. Therefore, their
chances of reaching a microenvironment with usable water become negligible.
-4
On the other hand, if they stay lodged, they will again face the 5 X 10-4
probability of contacting usable water during the new dust storm cycle.
It can be seen that the effect of the loop between the "Lodged with Shield"
and "Survived Lodging" states is to return half of the "Survived" population
to the "Lodged" state at the end of each cycle. This is equivalent to
doubling the transition probabilities out of the "Lodged with Shield"
state toward the two trapping states. Figure 3.16 depicts this simplified
version of the Transport Submodel.
Using this approximation, the probability that a
VTO eventually reaches a microenvironment with usable water is as in-
dicated below:
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IMPLANTATION R
0.045
P, = 
10-2
VTOs RELEASED
BY EROSION ," DUSTBORNE
14.89
FIGURE 3.16 APPROXIMATE VERSION OF THE TRANSPORT SUBMODEL
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VTO Probability of
Release Reaching Usable
Mechanism Transport Variables Water
-3 -3
Implantation (0.005 + 0.5 X 10 ) = 5.5 X 10
-3 -5
Erosion 0.01 x (0.005 + 0.5 X 10 ) = 5.5 10
-3
Vibration 0.001 1.0 X 10
The total expected number of VTOs reaching water is therefore approxi-
mately:
-3 -4
Implantation: 0.045 x 5.5 X 10 3 2.5 X 10
-5 -4
Erosion: 14.89 X 5.5 X 10-5 8.2 X 10
-3 -4
Vibration: 0. 11 X 1 X 10 1.1 X 10
-4
Total 11.8 X 10
From this perspective, the most critical model
variables are:
(1) The number of VTOs released by erosion (llrel).
(2) The number of VTOs released by implantation (10rel).
(3) The probability that a VTO will reach a micro-
environment with usable water after transportation
by a dust storm (P6 or 2tra).
(4) The probability that a VTO will survive transporta-
tion by a dust storm (Pl or itra).
Sensitivity analyses discussed in Section 4 confirm that these are the
most crucial variables.
3.3.4.2 Markov Model Computations
Exact results for the characteristics of the
Transport Submodel can be obtained by using standard Markov process
analysis techniques. One quantity of interest is the multistep tran-
sition probability p.ij(n), which denotes the probability of being in
state j having started in state i after n cycles have passed. An
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example might be the probability of a VTO that started as a "Dustborne"
organism being trapped in a. water microenvirornment ftcr 
n cycles. We
could, of courseP compute similar quantities for other starting and
trapping states. Another quantity that will be computed 
is the number
of cycles required to trap all but a few of those organisms 
entering the
process.
For the sake of those computations, the six-state
Markov process will be reduced to three states: the holding 
state
"Survived Lodging" (L), and the two trapping states: "Nonviable" (N)
and "Reached Usable Water" (H). The three other states of the six-state
model were only useful to specify transition probabilities and input
variables. The three-state model represented in Figure 3.17 is compu-
tationally much simpler.
The transition probabilities and input variables
shown in Figure 3.17 have been computed from the six-state Markov 
model
variables as follows:
-4P2PI(P +P + 2.8X I0
H 121 6 4 10,11
)  13 P10,11 2.8 10
PN 12[ 2,3 57+ 4 8 13 8 0.5
PL = P (P P P) = 1 - P - PN 0.5
The expected number of VTOs starting in each of
the three states is computed from the state occupancies of the six-state
Markov model at the end of the first cycle following release. Thus,
calling VI, VE, and V the expected number of VTOs released by implantation,
erosion, and vibration, respectively, one obtains:
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REACHED
V H = 10.7 x 10-
4  
- USABLE 1.0
WATER
(H)
P H = 2.8 x 10-4
SURVIVED
VL = 0.206 LODGING
(L)
P N 2- 0.5
P 0.5
V N 14.83 NONVIABLE 1.0
(N)
FIGURE 3.17 THREE-STATE REDUCED PROCESS SHOWING TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
AND STARTING STATE OCCUPANCIES
-4
V = (P6 + PP011) (PIVE + VI) + P lIIlV 10.7 x 10
VN = P 3VE + (P 7 + PP ) (PVE + VI ) + PV 14.83
VL = P [V + P(PIV + V )] - 0.21
The n-step transition matrix 0(n) of the three-
state process is simply:
1 0 0
0(n) = 0 1 0
P P Pn
N n H n L
(L-PL) (L-P)
L L
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where the rows and columns from left to right and top to bottom corres-
pond to states "N," "H," and L.
As n approaches infinity (the steady state), the
"N" and "H" trapping states collect all the microbes, and the limiting
transition probability matrix is:
1 0 0
((6) = o 1 0
p PH
l-P L  1-P L
Thus,. the expected number of VTOs reaching a micro-
-4
environment with usable water is found to be 11.84 X 10 .
Another useful computation is the number of cycles
or transitions, n, required before all but a small fraction, y, of
organisms are trapped. Using the notation developed in Figure 3.17,
this number is found to be:
In (y/V L )
n 2
In (PL)
-4
Thus, the number of cycles required to trap all but 10 organisms (the
contamination constraint) is:
-4
10in (-
0.21
n >_ -- -11ln(0.5)
The following tabulation gives n for a few values of y:
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Values of y
-1 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10
10 10 10 10 10 10
n (number
of cycles
or transitions) 1 5 11 18 24 31
Assuming one dust storm per year, it can be seen
that most released organisms are trapped after a few years on the Martian
surface.
3.3.5 Transport Submodel Summary
Table 3.3 summarizes the Transport Submodel by giving the
probability of reaching a microenvironment with usable water for VTOs
released by implantation, erosion) and vibration.
For example, the table shows that VTOs released by implan-
tation, although 300 times less numerous than VTOs released by erosion,
have a 100 times greater chance of reaching usable water than the latter.
As has been explained in this section, this is due to the relatively
high exposure of VTOs released by erosion to UV radiation. Such a large
difference clearly emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing between
various release mechanisms and making assessments of the probability of
growth conditional on the release mode of the microbe.
-4
The output shows that a total of 11.8 X 10 microbes will
survive transit to a microenvironment with usable water. Of these, 70
percent were released by erosion, 20 percent by implantation, and 10
percent by vibration.
The transport process has been described by a Markov model,
but the results are rather insensitive to the Markovian assumption
because 91 percent of the VTOs finding usable water do so during the
first dust storm cycle following their release.
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Table 3.3
TRANSPORT SUBMODEL SUMMARY
Expected Number of VTOs Conditional Probability of Expected Number of VTOs Total Expected Number of VTOs
Released Reaching Usable Water Reaching Usable Water Reaching Usable Water
in a Viable State
Implantation 5.53 X 10 2.46 X 10
0. 045
Erosion 5.53 X 10 8. 23 X 10-4 11.84 X 10
14.89
00
-3 -4
Vibration 1.05 X 10 1. 16 x 10
0.11
3.4 The Reproduction Submodel
In this final component model, we examine the probability of repro-
duction of the viable organisms that are transported to a microenviron-
ment with usable water.
3.4.1 Reproduction Submodel Parameters
Figure 3.18 shows three inputs to the Reproduction Submodel:
(1) the expected number of VTOs that reach usable water, (2) the fraction
of these organisms that are suited to the Martian environment (assuming
that they are protected from UV radiation), and (3) the availability of
nutrients necessary to support microbial growth and proliferation. We
combine these last two inputs into a single probability that a VTO,
brought by the lander, protected from UV radiation and inhabiting a
microenvironment with usable water, will reproduce. Figure 3.19 shows
the results of these calculations.
3.4.1.1 Resistance to Environment
The first consideration is the probability that a
randomly selected VTO on the lander could reproduce in the Martian
environment, assuming UV shield, water, and the existence of adequate
nutrients. These spores must in particular be heat resistant, faculta-
tively psychrophilic, facultatively anaerobic, and capable of with-
standing low pressure. As mentioned earlier, this question can be
addressed by experimentation in microbiology laboratories, but it has
received virtually no attention until recently.
Studies have been conducted to characterize psychro-
philic spore formers in the wild microbe population that might contaminate
the Viking spacecraft. Surprisingly, very few of these microbes were
found in soil samples from the Denver manufacturing area but significant
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EXPECTED VTOs
REACHING USABLE WATER
,MiCRGENViRONMENT
Expected Number
SUITABILITY OF REPRODUCTION i of VTOs that
VTOs TO MARTIAN I SUBMODEL Reproduce
ENVIRONMENT
AVAILABILITY OF
NUTRIENTS
FIGURE 3.18 THE REPRODUCTION SUBMODEL
numbers were shown to exist in the soil of the assembly areas at Cape
Kennedy. These microbes have been subjected to an artificial Martian
environment and then incubated at 70C to demonstrate their ability to
grow at low temperatures. Bacterial counts also taken from soil samples
incubated at 100C and 000C revealed a decrease of approximately 3 orders
of magnitude in the population size at the lower temperature. Recent
investigations4 1 have shown that among wild organisms collected at
Cape Kennedy (teflon ribbon experiment), 33 bacillus isolates survived
the proposed 1130C dry heat sterilization cycle. Some of the survivors
-2
were able to support a temperature of -650C at 10 torr pressure. A
large proportion also demonstrated anaerobic growth after several days of
incubation in the Brewer Anaerobe Jar at 240C and with appropriate
nutrients. These isolates will be subjected to artificial conditions
closer to the Martian environment in the near future.
For our analysis we assumed that 5 percent of the
VTOs that reach usable water and are shielded from UVs will grow and
reproduce, provided they have access to necessary nutrients.
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0.05 Available
VTOs Facultatively
Psychrophilic and
Anaerobic
No
0.95
1.2 x 10 3  x 0.05 x 0.1 p 6 x 10
6
Output From Facultatively Availability Expected Number
Transport Psychrophilic of Nutrients of VTOs
Model and Anaerobic That Reproduce
FIGURE 3.19 REPRODUCTION SUBMODEL CALCULATIONS
3.4.1.2 Availability of Nutrients
The second consideration is the availability of
nutrients at locations where usable water exists. There are large uncer-
tainties about this issue; as long as possible survivors have not been
identified, we cannot specify what nutrients are necessary for microbial
reproduction. Relying on expert judgment without further modeling, we
have assigned 1 chance in 10 to the availability of nutrients.
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3.4.2 Reproduction Submodel Summary
The joint probability that one of the surviving organisms
that has reached a microenvironment with usable water and has been
protected from UVs will be suited to the environment and will find the
-3
appropriate nutrients to grow and proliferate is 5 X 10 . This proba-
bility multiplied by the expected number of VTOs reaching water, 1.2 X
-3
10 , produces the expected number of organisms that will grow on Mars:
-6
6 X 10 This number is taken to be the probability of biological con-
tamination of the planet Mars by each of the two Viking landers.
Finally, it should b6 noted that both parameters of the
Reproduction Submodel are of paramount importance because a change in
either one will be reflected by a proportional change in the probability
of contamination and both parameters are highly uncertain.
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4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The purpose of this section is to measure how sensitive the assess-
ment of the probability of contamination is to changes in modeling assump-
tions and value assignments. Although many experts have been consulted,
the model developed in Section 3 is inevitably an approximate represen-
tation of the events leading to contamination. There are undoubtedly
contamination mechanisms that have not been imagined yet, and those
included in the model have necessarily beenlimited to keep the model
tractable. Furthermore, in the present state of scientific information,
many model parameters are not known with certainty. It is therefore
important to know how these uncertainties affect the resulting probability
of contamination and how this probability might change if some of the
uncertainties were resolved. A sensitivity analysis can provide the
answers. It will determine and rank the most crucial variables, i.e., the
variables that, if exactly known, might cause the greatest changes in the
result. These variables should then be considered candidates for further
investigation.
The following exposition is intended to illustrate the methodology
and provide the reader with the detailed results. Major insights from
this analysis have already been explained in Section 3. In fact, sen-
sitivity analyses were used throughout the research effort to guide
development of the contamination model. The results have been gathered
here for the sake of clarity and easy reference.
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4.1 Model Structure and Sensitivity Analysis Methodology
The complete probability of contamination model has been given a
very simple mathematical structure owing to the appropriate 
definition
of state variables. The model can be expressed in matrix notations as:
P(C) = nf TRB . (4.1)
Writing out the vectors and matrices using subscripts, the model can be
expressed as:
3 4
P(C) = nf i t r ijb , (4.2)
i=1 j=l
where
P(C) = probability of contamination
B = (b ) = Bio-Burden Submodel vector, which contains
the expected number of VTOs on the lander that lie
on external, covered, and mated surfaces and that
are encapsulated into solid material.
Correspondence with earlier notation, as for example, Eq. (1.2):
P(C) =E Pi k(G) E(Ni )
k, i
Only the k = 1 term is retained, the fraction f of the VTOs assumed to
be adapted to the Martian environment. For the ith release mechanism,
i = 1,2,3, nft i is equivalent to the probability of growth Pi,1 (G). The
expected number of organisms released by the ith release mechanism is
4
r b ,b equivalent to E(N. i).P
j=1
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R = (rij) = Release Submodel matrix. Expresses the fraction
of VTOs at each of the four locations cited above that
will be released in a viable state by implantation,
erosion, and vibration.
T = (ti) = Transport Submodel vector. Indicates the fraction
of VTOs released by each of the three release mechanisms
that will reach a microenvironment with usable water in
a viable state.
f = fraction of VTOs capable of growth in a Martian
microenvironment with usable water.
n = probability that necessary nutrients will be available
in Martian microenvironment with usable water.
Each of the factors above depends on a number of state variables,
but for each submodel--Bio-Burden, Release, Transport and Reproduction--
the state variables are separate and their uncertainties may be regarded
as independent. This remarkable property permits a component-by-component
sensitivity analysis in the following manner:
(1) The output variables of each component model are related
to the overall probability of contamination. The
corresponding relationships can be called the transfer func-
tions of the submodels.
(2) Analyses are performed within each component model to
measure the sensitivity of output variables to changes in
state variables (including input variables). The variations
of the output variables are then related to the probability
of contamination via the transfer functions.
Note that this approach facilitates assessment of the effect of
alternative modeling assumptions. If the internal structure of one
component model is modified in some way without redefining output vari-
ables, the effect of the new structure is reflected by a new transfer
function and new output variables assignments. Such changes can be
incorporated immediately into our model.
The Subsection 4.2 presents the submodel transfer functions. Sub-
section 4.3 considers component-by-component sensitivity analysis, and
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subsection 4.4 reviews in detail the sensitivity analysis results for
the most crucial variables.
4.2 Submodel Transfer Functions
The effect of each submodel can be summarized by the values of its
parameters in Eq. (4.2). These parameters have been computed in Section
3 and the related appendices. Thus the output variables of each submodel
are related to the probability of contamination in the following manner:
Reproduction Submodel (see subsection 3.4)
(Probability of (1/200) nu ber of VTOs
Ccontamination / reaching usable water
P(C) (nf) (TRB) (4.3)
* Transport Submodel (see subsection 3.3)
reaching usable wate by implantation
m 5.526 X 10 s number of VTOs release
(TRB) (t ) (RB)
-5x number of VTOs released
by erosion
(t 2 ) (RB)2
1.052 X l0-3 xnumber of VTOs released)
by vibration
(t 3 ) (RB) 3
In other words, each implanted organism has about 5 times the
chance of causing contamination as does each organism released
by vibration and 100 times the chance as does each organism re-
leased by erosion. Using Eq. (4.3) above, we obtain the numerical
result:
Probability of -5 number of VTOs release
contamination by implantation
-7 number of VTOs released
X 2.763 X 10 X
\by erosion
(4.4)
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-6 number of VTOs released)
x 5.260 x 10 X by vibration
y vibration
* Release Submodel (see Subsection 3.2). The expected number of
of VTOs released by each of the three release mechanisms
is related to the expected number of VTOs on external,
covered, and mated surfaces and encapsulated in solid
materials by the following matrix multiplication:
Number of VTOs by Release Probabilities Number of VTOs by
Released Mec anism Location Type
-3 -4 -4 -6
Implantation 2 x 10 10 10 10 external
= -2 -4Erosion 0 0.8 10 10 covered("' s-2 -6 -6 -8
Vibration 10 10 10 10-8 mated
encapsulated
(RB) (R) (B)
Combining the above relation with the Transport and Reproduction
submodels gives:
Probability of\ 
-7
(robability o= 1.077 X 10 X (external)
contamination
-7
2.238 X 10 X (covered) (4.5)
-9
5.53 X 10 X (mated)
-11
5.53 X 10 X (encapsulated)
which immediately shows the relative importance of the bio-
burden locations: a single VTO on a covered surface has
about 2, 40,. and 4,000 times greater chance of contaminating
Mars than does a single VTO on an external surface, a mated
surface, or encapsulated in solid materials, respectively.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Submodels
The preceding relations combined with Project Viking team estimates
of the bio-burden by location (11 external, 16 covered, 9 mated, and
20,000 encapsulated), indicate the relative contributions of the various
contamination mechanisms. These contributions by bio-burden location
type and release mechanism are represented in Figure 4.1 on a percentage
scale.
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FIGURE 4.1 RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROBABILITY OF CONTAMINATION (PER CENT)
FIGURE 4.1 RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROBABILITY OF CONTAMIINATION (PER CENT)
Interestingly, 98.3 percent of the probability of contamination
can be accounted for by the contribution of five sources:
Contribution to
Contamination
Bio-Burden Location Release Mechanism (percent)
Covered Erosion 59.7
External Implantation 10.3
External Vibration 9.7
Encapsulated Erosion 9.3
Encapsulated Implantation 9.3
(after fracturing)
98.3
The contribution from organisms on mated surfaces (0.8%) is negligible.
The next two subsections cover detailed sensitivity analyses of the
Release and Transport Submodels. The most crucial variables will be
pointed out; their importance will easily be justified in the light of
the major contamination sources just examined.
4.3.1 Release Submodel
The Release Submodel contains 13 variables, including the 4
input variables describing the bio-burden. These variables are defined
in the first column of Table 4.1. Braces denote event probabilities,
that is, AB = 0.1 is read as there is a 0.1 probability assigned to
the event A, given that the event B has occurred. Column 3 recalls the
nominal values. Columns 2 and 4 indicate low and high values used in the
sensitivity analysis. Variations in the output variables are related to
the probability of contamination by the Transport Submodel transfer
fucntion (see Eq. 4.4).
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Table 4.1
RELEASE SUBMODEL MARGINAL SENSITIVITIES
Release Model Variables Relative
Probability of
Parameters Being Varied Values Contamination
Low Nominal High Low High
lbio, external 2.2 11 55 0.84 1.80
2bio, covered 3.2 16 80 0.52 3.42
3bio, mated 1.8 9 45 0.99 1.03
4bio, encapsulated 4,000 20,000 100,000 0.85 1.75
lrel Hard landing] 0.0004 0.002 0.01 0.88 1.62
2rel wly hard, covered 0.01 0.1 1.00 0.99 1.10
exposed or mated
Newly -4 -3 -2
3rel exposed hard, encapsulated 10 10 10 0.92 1.84
lexposed na e
I I -4 -3 -2
4rel Implanted Isoft 10 10 10 0.95 1.46
5rel Implanted Ihard 0.1 0.5 1.00 0.88 1.16
I I -3 -2 -1
6rel VTO vibration 10 10 10 0.91 1.88
7rel VTO erosion, covered 0.1 0.8 1.00 0.48 1.15
8rel VTO erosion, mated 10 10 10 1.00 1.04
-5 -4 -3
9rel IVTO erosion, encapsulated 10 10 10 0.92 1.84
Note: A IB indicates the probability assigned to event A given the occurrence
of event B.
4.3.1.1 Marginal Sensitivity Analysis
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4.1 reflect the relative
changes in the probability of contamination when model variables are
varied one at a time and the other variables are held constant at their
nominal values.
Thus, seven variables appear to be critical with
the extreme low and high values in the table. By order of decreasing
importance they are:
(1) The expected number of VTOs on covered surfaces of the
lander (2bio).
(2) The survivability of VTOs on external surfaces or newly
exposed to the vibration release mechanism (6rel).
(3) The survivability of encapsulated VTOs to the erosion
process (9rel).
(4) The fraction of encapsulated organisms newly exposed on
hard landing (3rel).
(5) The expected number of VTOs on external surfaces (lbio).
(6) The expected number of VTOs encapsulated in solid materials
(4bio).
(7) The probability of a hard landing (lrel).
Note that two variables in the list are relative to
the hard landing outcome even though 99.8 percent of the total number of
released VTOs are liberated by aeolian erosibn following a soft landing.
The reasons for this apparent paradox are that a hard landing considerably
increases the number of VTOs directly implanted in the Martian soil and
that these VTOs are about 100 times more likely to survive and proliferate
than those released by erosion.
Equally interesting is the confirmation that some
variables, despite their uncertainty, play negligible roles. In par-
ticular:
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* The expected number of VTOs on mated surfaces (3bio).
* The lethality of the erosion process for VTOs on mated
surfaces (8rel).
* The fraction of organisms on covered or mated surfaces that
are newly exposed on hard landing (2rel).
Additional information on these parameters is not
likely to cause any significant change in the probability of contamination.
4.3.1.2 Joint Sensitivity Analysis
There is no apparent dependency among the critical
variables of the Release Submodel except for the Bio-Burden Submodel
parameters that are all affected by common sterilization procedures.
However, nonlinearities of the model make it necessary to study joint
sensitivities, i.e.. the effect of combined variations of several param-
eters on the probability of contamination.
The total number of possible combinations of 13
13
variables is extremely large (2 - 14), but the model structure and
marginal sensitivity analyses suggest the important combinations to inves-
tigate. Two categories can be distinguished:
(1) Combinations of marginally critical parameters.
(2) Combinations of parameters that are not marginally sensitive
by themselves but that together have a large combined effect.
These parameters will be located on the same paths in the
Release tree.
Table 4.2 represents the relative effect of the most
critical pair of parameters. The pair is a combination of the second
category above, parameters having large combined effect. Thus, two vari-
ables increasing independently the probability of contamination by a fac-
tor less than 2 are shown to increase it more than 6 times when varied
jointly.
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Table 4.2
MOST CRITICAL PAIR OF PARAMETERS
IN THE RELEASE SUBMODEL
VTO Vibration
External
-3 -2 -1
10 10 10
2.2 0.82 0.84 1.02
11.0 0.91 1.00 1.88
55.0 1.36 1.80 6.19
Numbers in the margins are values of
the corresponding parameters: expected
number of VTOs on external surfaces and
the probability that a VTO will be viably
released by vibration.
Numbers in the center of the table are
relative probabilities of contamination.
Table 4.3 lists the eight most critical pairs. Only
extreme values of the parameters are considered for their effect on the
probability of contamination. The first four pairs in the list are
combinations of parameters having large combined effects. The next four
are combinations of marginally critical parameters. The expected number
of VTOs on covered surfaces appears in all four. Pair number eight may
play a more important role than indicated in the table because of the
possible dependency between the expected number of covered and encapsulated
VTOs.
Combinations of three of more parameters should also
be studied. However, we can note that no path in the tree depends on
more than five parameters and the search for crucial combinations should
be limited to five parameters. Also, when the number of independent
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Table 4.3
MOST CRITICAL PAIRS OF PARA1TERS A TIRIPT
IN THE RELEASE SUBMODEL
Relative Probability
Release Model Variables of Contamination
(nominal = 1.00)
Parameters Being Varied
Simultaneously Low High Low High
External 2.2 55
1. I. -3 -1 0.82 6.19
VT1 1 vibration 10 10
Encapsulated 4,000 100,000
2. Newly hard, encapsulated -4 -2 0.83 
5.95
lexposed Y 10
Encapsulated 4,000 100,000 0.83 5.95
300,00 
0.83 5.95
VTO I erosion, encapsulated 10 10
-4 -2
Hard landing 4 10 10
4 - 0.86 5.83
lexposed I hard, encapsulatedS 10 10
Covered 3.2 80
5. VTO vibration 10 10
Covered 3.2 80
6. 0.43 4.26
Newly hard, encapsulated 10 102
lexposed
Covered 3.2 80
7.-5 -3 0.43 4.26
I VTO erosion, encapsulatedi 10 10
Covered 3.2 80
8. 0.36 4.22External 
2.2 55
Encapsulated 4,000 100 000
5 -4 -2
Hard landing 4 X 10 10
9. 0.78 24.90
Newly Ihard, encapsulated 10 10
- 2
exposed1
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parameters increases, the likelihood of each one having very high values
decreases.
The most important triplet has been included at the
bottom of Table 4.3. The combined effect of variations of the expected
number of encapsulated VTOs, the probability of a hard landing, and the
fraction of microbes newly exposed because of a hard landing can multiply
the contamination probability by a factor of 25. The next most important
triplets have a multiplicative effect of only 10.
4.3.2 Transport Submodel
The Transport Submodel is described by nine uncertain variables,
including the three input variables. These variables are defined in the
first column of Table 4.4. As in Table 4.2, low, nominal. and high val-
ues are indicated in Columns 2, 3, and 4.
4.3.2.1 Marginal Sensitivity Analysis
The last two columns of Table 4.4 show very clearly
that, other than the input variables corresponding to the expected number
of VTOs released by implantation, erosion, and vibration, only three
variables are highly sensitive:
(1) The probability of finding usable water after transport
by a dust storm (P6 or 2tra).
(2) The probability of surviving transit in a dust storm
(P1 or ltra).
(3) To a lesser degree than the first two variables, the
probability that water will be deposited on a VTO
lodged with shield during a dust storm cycle.
These results are in accordance with the simplified
but almost exact view of the transport submodel given in Figure 3.16. As
seen in subsection 3.4, this representation implies that the only possible
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Table 4.4
TRANSPORT SUBMODEL MARGINAL SENSITIVITIES
Transport Model Parameters Probability of
Contamination
Variables Being Varied Values (nominal = 1.00)
Low Nominal High Low High
Release Submodel inputs
10rel, implantation 0.0045 0.045 0.445 0.81 2.87
llrel, erosion 1.489 14.89 148.9 0.37 7.25
12rel, vibration 0.011 0.11 1.1 0.91 
1.88
Transport Submodel parameters
ltra Survive transiti (P) 0.001 0.01 0.1 0.37 7.64
2tra Find water (P6) 0.0005 0.005 0.05 0.26 8.42
3tra lFind lodging (P4) 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.92 1.08
4tra Water deposition (P ) 0.00005 0.0005 0.005 0.84 2.5711
5tra Swept aloft) (P ) 0.05 0.5 0.95 1.00 1.00
6tra (Death while lodged I (P ) 0.0001 0.001 0.01 1.00 1.00
transportation by a dust storm occurs when a VTO is released by erosion.
This limited transport process still accounts for 99.3 percent of the
probability of contamination.
4.3.2.2 Joint Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 3.16 also suggests the critical combinations
of variables. These are the combinations of variables on each path
to the usable water microenvironment state. Table 4.5 contains the
joint effects of these combined variations. As always in the case of
joint sensitivities where the variables are varied on a given set of
low and high values, the effect of joint variations increases rapidly
with the number of variables in each combination. At the same time, the
probability of these variables having simultaneously high or low values
usually becomes very small. The only exception is when the variables
are positively correlated. Thus, if each of the independent variables
in Table 4.5 is given, say, a 2 percent chance of exceeding its extreme
high values, the high effects of pair-wise variations and triple vari-
4
ations will have, respectively, only 4 chances in 10 and 8 chances in
6
10 of occurring.
4.4 Identification of Variables Most Crucial to the Probability
of Contamination
The main results from sensitivity analysis on the Release and
Transport Submodels are recapitulated in Table 4.6 with the addition of
the two crucial variables of the Reproduction Submodel. For each of
13 variables the table indicates 2 extreme values (low and high), 2
intermediate values (low and high), and 1 nominal value. The marginal
sensitivity of the probability of contamination to the assignment
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Table 4.5
TRANSPORT SUBi\ODEL JOINT SENSITIVITIES
Probability of
Contamination
Transport Model Variables (nominal = 1.00)
Variables Being Varied Low High Low High
1. Erosion 1.489 148.9
Survive transit (Pl) 0.001 0.1
2. ISurvive transit (Pl) 0.001 0.1
ind water 1 0.14 69.39
Find water (P6) 0.0005 0.05
3. Erosion 1.489 148.9
I 0.14 65.84
lFind water (P6) 0.0005 0.05
4. Implantation 0.0045 0.45
0.22 25.59
Find water (P6) 0.0005 0.05
5. Erosion 1.489 148.9
Survive transit (Pl) 0.001 0.1 0.13 670.79
IFind water (P ) 0.0005 0.05
6
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Table 4.6
CONTAMINATION MODEL: MARGINAL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Contamination Model Variables Probability of
Contamination:
Values (units are 10-6)
(nominal = 5.9)
Extreme Intermediate Intermediate Extreme
Parameters Being Varied Low Low Nominal High High Low High
Bio-Burden variables
lbio External 2.2 5.5 11 22 55 5.0 10.7
2bio Covered 3.2 8 16 32 80 3.1 20.2
4bio Encapsulated 4,000 10,000 20,000 40,000 100,000 5.0 10.4
Release Model variables
Irel Hard landing 0.0004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.01 5.2 9.6
3rel Newly*3rexposed hard, encapsulated' 0.0001 0.0002 0.001 0.005 0.01 5.4 10.9
exposed
4rel Implanted Isoft 0.0001 0.0002 0.001 0.005 0.01 5.7 8.7
6rel VTO vibration 0.001 0.002 0.01 0.05 0.1 5.4 11.1
9rel jVTO erosion, encapsulated 0.00001 0.00002 0.0001 0.0005 0.001 5.4 10.9
Transport Model variables
Itra Survive transit (Pl) 0.001 0.002 0.01 0.05 0.1 2.2 45.2
2tra Find water (P6) 0.0005 0.001 0.005 0.025 0.05 1.5 49.9
4tra Water deposition (P11) 0.00005 0.0001 0.0005 0.0025 0.005 5.0 15.2
Reproduction Model variables
Irep Facultative psychrophiles 0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.6 29.6
I and anaerobes
2rep Nutrients 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 29.6
Low and High values of the probability of contamination correspond to extreme low and high values of the
variables.
of extremely low and high values to each of the input variables (the
other variables being held at their nominal value) is shown in the two
last columns. Intermediate values will be used later for simulation
purposes.
It is very unlikely that an increase in any single state variable
-4
could cause the probability of contamination to exceed 10 However, a
combination of increases might have this effect. This possibility will
be explored in two ways: by drawing from results of previous joint
sensitivity analysis and by simulation (see Subsection 4.5).
From the results of joint sensitivity analysis on the Release and
Transport Submodels, it is easy to identify the most likely informational
changes that could cause the contamination constraint to be exceeded.
The Transport Submodel is highly sensitive to two inputs: the
expected number of VTOs released by erosion and released by implantation.
The Release Submodel shows that most VTOs released by erosion were located
on covered surfaces. Also important to note is that originally encap-
sulated VTOs, newly exposed because of a hard landing, contribute to
half the implanted VTOs and there are large uncertainties associated
with this number.
Thus, three series of informational changes can be imagined that
-4
lead to a probability of contamination in excess of 10
(1) Soft landing--As indicated in Table 4.7, if the number
of VTOs on covered surfaces is twice the nominal value
and if the four key variables of the Transport and
Reproduction Submodels have also been underestimated by
a factor of 2, the probability of contamination becomes
larger than 10- 4 .
(2) Hard landing--A similar result is obtained if the
fraction of encapsulated VTOs newly exposed because of
a hard landing, the probability of a hard landing, and
the number of encapsulated VTOs are larger than expected
by factors of 5, 2, and 2, respectively. These circumstances
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Table 4.7
THREE SERIES OF INFORMATIONAL CHANGES CAUSING THE PROBABILITY OF
CONTAMINATION TO EXCEED 10- 4
Variables
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
(Soft (Hard Combination of
Nominal
Definition Value Landing) Landing) Cases 1 and 2
Definition Value
Bio-burden Submodel
2bio, covered 16 32 --* 32
4bio,' encapsulated 20,000 -- 40,000 40,000
CP Release Submodel
Irel iHard landing 0.002 0-- .004 0.004
3rel Newly
exposed hard, encapsulated 0.001 -- 0.005 0.005
Transport Submodel
Itra Survive transit I (P) 0.01 0.02 -- 0.016
2tra IFind water (P) 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.008(P6
Reproduction Submodel
Irep I Facultative psychrophilesl 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08
and anaerobes
2rep Nutrients) 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.16
Dashes stand for nominal values.
greatly increase the expected number of implanted VTOs.
If the probability of finding usable water and the
Reproduction Submodel parameters are the same as for
this first case, the probability of contamination will
again exceed 10-4 .
(3) Combination of the two previous series of informational
changes, as shown in the last column of Table 4.7.
Detailed sensitivity analyses confirm that the eventualities just men-
tioned are by far the most likely to cause a violation of the contamination
constraint. It is generally felt that the probability of occurrence of
these or more pessimistic eventualities is on the order of 1 percent.
4.5 Simulation of the Effect of Additional Information
What is the risk that additional information about quantities in
the model would lead us to revise the probability of contamination to a
value in violation of the constraint? We can address this question by
assigning probabilities to the values that an input quantity might have
if more information were available to determine it. For example, con-
sider the encapsulated bio-burden. We have a nominal value of 20,000
assigned to this quantity, but we do not know that this number is correct.
Suppose we could find the true value. What probability would we assign
to receiving the information that the encapsulated bio-burden is really
100,000 or greater? What probability would we assign that the encapsu-
lated bio-burden is really 4,000 or less? We could assign a probability
distribution on the entire range of each of the input quantities in the
assessment model.
Although this process could be carried out, it is cumbersome and
involves exhaustive encoding of expert judgment in the form of probability
distributions. We have chosen instead to do an approximate calculation
using the values in the sensitivity analysis. We make the following
approximations:
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(1) The uncertainty in each of the variables is assumed to
be independent.
(2) The uncertainty in each variable is described by a
discrete probability distribution, defined as follows:
* First simulation--The nominal value is given a
probability of 0.7, and the extreme values are
given a total probability of 0.3 in such a way
that the expected value remains equal to the
nominal value.
* Second simulation--The nominal value is given a
probability of 0.5, and the remaining 0.5 probability
is shared between the intermediate low and inter-
mediate high values in such a way that the expected
value remains equal to the nominal value.
Example 1: Probability Distribution for the Number of VTOs on
External Surfaces (lbio)
First Simulation Second Simulation
Value Probability Value Probability
2.2 0.250 5.5 0.333
11 0.700 11 0.500
55 \ 0.050 22 0.167
Example 2: Fraction of Encapsulated Organisms Surviving Release
by Erosion
First Simulation Second Simulation
Value Probability Value Probability
-5 -5
1 X 10 0.273 2X 10 0.417
-4 -4
I X 10 0.700 1 X 10 0.500
-3 -4
1 X 10 0.027 5 X 10 0.083
Figure 4.2 shows the excess probability distributions on the risk
of contamination that result from the two simulations described above.
The excess probability should be interpreted as the probability that,
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given the current state of information, the risk of contamination, if
it could be known with certainty, would exceed a given value. Note that
the horizontal scale on Figure 4.2 is logarithmic and a distribution
approximately symmetrical on this scale is in fact extremely skewed.
Also,. the expected value of the distribution cannot be found intuitively
as on a linear scale. The main statistics of the distribution are
reported on Figure 4.2. In particular, there is a 1 to 2 percent chance
-4
that the mission allocation of 1 X 10 will be exceeded.
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FIGURE 4.2 P(C)*, PROBABILITY OF CONTAMINATION GIVEN FURTHER INFORMATION
5 RESULTS, RATIONALE FOR NEW METHODOLOGY, AND A RECOMMENDATION
5.1 Results of the Analysis
The overall result for the probability of contamination by each
-6
Viking lander is 6 X 10 . This value is approximately a factor of 16
below the mission constraint imposed by NASA.
The sensitivity analysis in Section 4 shows that this result does
not vary drastically when the assumptions and inputs used in the analysis
are varied over a range of reasonable possibilities. However, large
simultaneous changes in several input variables could cause a violation
of the constraints (see Table 4.7).
To determine the sensitivity of the overall assessment to additional
information, an approximate calculation was performed in which 16 of the
input variables in the assessment model were considered uncertain. Ad-
ditional information would cause these inputs to be revised. We modeled
the effect of additional information by assigning probabilities to the
eventuality that the variables would take on higher or lower values than
-6
the nominal values used in arriving at the assessment of 6 X 10 . The
resulting calculations showed a probability of a few percent that the
-4
constraint of 10 might be violated and a probability of 50 percent that
-6
the probability of contamination would be revised to less than 10 on
the basis of additional information (see Figure 4.2).
This calculation indicates the need for additional investigation
and research to resolve information gaps related to the contamination of
Mars. Some of the information gaps can be addressed by laboratory research
on earth, for example. the percentage of the poststerilization bio-burden
that is facultatively anaerobic and psychrophilic. The list of sensitive
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variables given in Table 4.6 may be useful as a guide to research
priritics.
5.2 Rationale for New Methodology
The Sagan-Coleman approach to assessing the probability of planetary
contamination is limited. Detailed information on the spectrum of microbes
in the bio-burden, lethality of release mechanisms, transport mechanisms,
and characteristics of potentially hospitable microenvironments on Mars
should be included in the assessment. This information can be included
by expanding the Sagan-Coleman approach beyond working with a single
number representing the expected level of VTO release and another single
number representing the probability of growth.
In this report we have shown how the detailed information now avail-
able can be structured into a model for assessing the probability of con-
tamination. The model has been documented in this report; it should be
subjected to periodic critical review by the community of scientists
concerned with planetary quarantine. As new information becomes avail-
able,. the model and its inputs should be suitably revised to include the
new information.
We believe that the use of formal models as a basis for planning
quarantine policy represents a substantial advance over NASA's current
approach, which relies on the parameter P(G). The detailed structural
basis for assessing the probability of microbial growth permits critical
examination and revision in the light of new evidence.
5.3 Recommendation
We recommend that NASA replace the current procedure of determining
mission sterilization requirements on the basis of a single probability
112
of growth by a procedure that distinguishes among types of organisms,
types of release mechanisms, and other characteristics that affect
whether an individual VTO released from a spacecraft will reproduce in
the environment of another planet.
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Appendix A
THE SAGAN-COLEMAN FORMULA--SUMMARY AND EXCERPTS
FROM A PREVIOUS SRI REPORT
I. Conceptual Limitations and Suggested Modifications
A model for analyzing the mission contamination problem was pro-
posed by Sagan and Coleman.1  This model served as the basis for dis-
cussions by the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) that resulted in
upper limits being set on the probability of contamination as a condition
for space missions in the vicinity of Mars. Considerable debate and
discussion of parameter values have taken place,4 2 143 but the basic
structural assumptions and resulting formulas are still widely accepted
by COSPAR, NASA, and NASA contractors as a means of determining sterili-
zation requirements for Project Viking and other future unmanned planetary
missions.
The basic structure, as depicted in Figure A.1, consists of a bio-
release model whose output is the mean number of viable organisms re-
leased, and of a proliferation model limited to a linear relationship
between the number of released organisms and the probability of contam-
ination. Specifically:
C = the event that Mars will be biologically contaminated
by organisms aboard the spacecraft.
N = the number of viable organisms released to the Martian
environment or into its atmosphere from the spacecraft
(a random variable).
E(N) = I P(N = k), the expected number of organisms released,
k=o
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G = the event that a single released organism will su vive,
multiply, and contaminatc a signi ficant fracLion of the
planet.
The Sagan-Coleman linear approximation for the mission contamination
probability is:
P(C) = E(N) P(G) (A.1)
This approximation is based on two implicit and questionable assumptions.
In Section 3 of this appendix we explore the implications of these assump-
tions in assessing the probability of planetary contamination.
th
If we define E. as the event that the i released organism does
not survive to multiply and cause contamination, it follows directly
that:
P(C) = 1 - P(E 1 and ... and EN)
= 1 - P(N = k) P(E 1 and ... and Ek IN = k) - P(N = 0).
k=1 (A.2)
If, given that k organisms are released, we assume the events E1, E2
E to be independent and of equal probability, then:
P(E 1 and ... and Ek N = k) = [P(EIIN = k)] k  (A.3)
The events E1, E2 ... , Em are called independent if for all choices
I "... E and for all combinations 1 f i < j ... m the multi-
plication rule
P(E. and E and ... and E ) = P(E )P(E.) ... P(E k )1 j k i j k
applies.
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Moreover, if we assume that the survival of any one organism is indepen-
dent of the number of organisms released, then:
P(E 1IN = k) = P(E1) = 1 - P(G) . (A.4)
Substituting Eqs. (A.1) and (A.4) into Eq. (A.5) gives us
P(C) = I - P(N = k) [1 - P(G)] k
k=0
1 - P(N = k) [1 - kP(G)]
k=0
E(N)P(G) . (A.5)
The approximation is justified by the fact that P(G) is very small and
only moderate values of N have significant probability. This relation-
ship is equivalent to Eq. (A.1).
Let us now consider the independence assumption underlying Eq. (A.3).
The events E , E2 ... Ek are clearly mutually dependent on the actual
character of the Martian environment, which to a large extent is not
yet known with certainty. Therefore, learning the fate of the first
k - 1 organisms tells us something about the kth organism's chances of
surviving and proliferating. The significance of this informational
dependence is illustrated by a more familiar problem in the following
section. Fortunately, the approximation introduced by assuming indepen-
dence yields a conservative estimate reasonably close to the true prob-
ability of contamination for numbers in the domain of interest.
The independence assumption underlying Eq. (A.4) dismisses the pos-
sibility that the number of released organisms depends on the landing
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mode, which in turn may affect survivability. In fact, a positive
correlation may exist between these two factors that would yield a
greater probability of contamination. Equation (A.4) is therefore inad-
equate, and the structure of the Sagan-Coleman model should be enriched
at least to the extent shown in Figure A.2--the addition of a landing
model through which the uncertainty relative to the landing mode is
explicitly expressed.
2. Significance of Informational Dependence in a Series of Otherwise
Identical Trials: A Classical Illustration
The following problem, which has been discussed in a slightly dif-
44
ferent form by Howard, provides an example of a familiar physical
process having identical but informationally dependent trials. Its
significance to the mission contamination problem will be discussed
shortly. Let us suppose that a tack is dropped onto a large flat sur-
face. The tack has two possible landing positions, labeled "heads" and
"tails" in the following diagram. You, the subject, are told only that
the tack in the diagram is drawn to scale, that a human being will drop
it from a height of four feet, and that the landing surface is very flat.
Your first problem is to assess the probability of its landing on its
head in 1 toss; your second problem is to assess the probability of 10
tails occurring in 10 tosses.
TAIL HEAD
SKETCH A
To respond that you do not know the probabilities, never having watched
any tack tossing, is unacceptable. The questions do not concern
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frequencies or any other type of physical fact. We ask only a quantifi-
cation of your judgment and recognize that different people will typicallyv
make different assessments. Now suppose that after much scrutiny of the
diagram, you assess the probability of a head in one toss to be 0.5.
Using only the rules of consistency imposed by probability theory, is 
it
possible to deduce your response to the second question from this? The
answer is no. You simply have not told us enough about your judgment
(or state of information). Before any calculations can be done (on your
behalf), we need to know something about how you believe the individual
tosses relate to one another. To fill in this gap, you might say that you
view the trials as independent, in which case we immediately have
10 -3
P(10 tails in 10 tosses) = (0.5) 0 10
But,. considering the characterization of independence given earlier,
does this assumption accurately reflect your state of information? It
seems unlikely, for undoubtedly you would be inclined to alter your initial
assessment for the probability of a head in one toss if we told you the
results of the first nine tosses.
Having rejected the independence assumption, how can you compactly
express the degree of dependence that you perceive to exist among the
results of the separate trials? Under a very mild assumption it can be
shown that the following characterization provides all the required in-
formation. Let
f = the fraction of heads that would be observed in a very
long sequence of tosses.
The assumption is that the trials be exchangeable. For a definition and
discussion of exchangeable trials see Ref. 45,
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With your current state of information f can be viewed only as a random
variable. What we need is your subjective (prior) probability distribution
for the random variable f. This is conveniently expressed by the cumu-
lative distribution function:
F(x) = P(f : x), x l 1
The mean (or expected value) of this distribution is given by:
1
E(f) = [1 - F(x)]dx
0
and consistency demands that it equal 0.5. That is, the axioms of prob-
ability theory require that your subjective probability of a head in one
trial equal the mean of your subjective distribution for the fraction of
heads in a great many trials.
Figures A.3 through A.5 show three possible distribution functions
for the random variable f, each of which is consistent with the earlier
assessment that P(head) = 0.5. The first of these distributions corres-
ponds to the case of independent trials, the subject being absolutely
certain that the long run fraction of heads will be 50 percent. Such a
distribution might be assessed by an individual who has spent the last
few months tossing this same tack onto this same surface. Although he
is uncertain as to what will happen in a few trials, his complete knowledge
Integration of parts shows this formula equivalent to the usual one in
terms of the density function or probability mass function.
tOf course, the subject would also view the trials as independent if he
were certain that the long run fraction would be 40 percent, or any other
specific number.
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F(x) = P(f < x)
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FIGURE A.3 DISTRIBUTION IMPLYING INDEPENDENT TRIALS
F 2  (x) = P(f < x)
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FIGURE A.5 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION
124
of the basic environment leads him to view the tack as equivalent to an
unbiased coin.
The second distribution (Figure A.4) corresponds to the case of
totally dependent trials. The subject is absolutely certain that the
tack will always come up either heads or tails, but he is not sure which.
(He might have an acquaintance who has tossed the tack many times and
told him it always falls one way, but left him to guess which way.) He
has assessed the probability of all heads to be 0.5 and that of all tails
to be 0.5. Note that if this subject were able to observe one toss, it
would resolve all his uncertainty about the outcomes of subsequent tosses.
The type of distribution that we would generally expect, intermedi-
ate to the preceding extreme cases, is shown in Figure A.5. Here the
subject reveals great uncertainty about the experiment's environment and
assigns a uniform distribution over the interval of possible values.
The mean of his distribution, like that of the others, is E(F) = 0.5.
Given the probability distribution for f, we can calculate the
probability of all tails in n trials using the formula
P(all tails in n trials) = E [(1- f)n] n : 1 . (A.6)
From this we have computed the relationships shown in Figure A.6 for
each distribution discussed earlier. The subject who views the trials
as independent thinks it very unlikely (less than 1 chance in 1,000)
that he would not observe a hcad in the 10 trials. In contrast. the
subject who views the trials as perfectly dependent continues to assign
a probability of 0.5 to the event of all tails, regardless of how many
times the tack will be tossed. The corresponding relationship for a
third subject lies between these two extremes. In particular, the third
This is an application of de Finetti's theorem.4 5
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subject assesses the probability of 10 tails in 10 trials to be about
0.09, 100 times the probability implied by the first distribution. Thus,
we find that the three individuals differ greatly in their assessment of
what is likely to occur in repeated trials, although they agree perfectly
about the probability of a head in a single trial. It is the degree of
informational dependence among trials that differs among subjects, and
these differences have significant implications.
TOTALLY DEPENDENT
TRIALS
0-1
-10 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION
-J
INDEPENDENT
TRIALS
10-2
U-.
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1o-4
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FIGURE A.G PROBABILTY OF ALL TAILS VERSUS NUMBER OF TRIALS
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3. Application of Informational Dependence to the Contamination Problem
A parallel between the preceding illustration and the contamination
th
problem can be drawn by associating the event "tail" on the i toss
with the Event E* previously defined as "the ith released organism does
1
not survive to multiply and cause contamination." Let us also rename
f as the fraction of a great many released organisms that would survive
and reproduce (a random variable). Then, given that k organisms are
released and that events El, E2, ... Ek are exchangeable, Eqs. (A.2) and
(A.6) yield:
P(C) = 1- E (1 - f)k] (A.7)
The degree of dependence that is perceived to exist among all events Ei
can be completely described by.a prior probability distribution for the
random variable f. A possible distribution is shown in Figures A.7 and
-5 -8
A.8. The expected value of f is 10 and its variance is 3.7 X 10 . A
typical value of k might be 10. Taking a series expansion of Eq. (A.7),
2
P(C) = 1 - E 1 - kf + (1/2)k(k - 1)f2 - ..
= kE(f) - (1/2)k(k - 1) E(f 2) +
and applying the illustrative values of k and f defined above, we verify
that the series converges rapidly:
-4 -6
P(C) - 10 - 1.7 X 10 + ...
More generally, it can be demonstrated that the first-order approximation
Q(C) = k E(f) (A.8)
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is always an upper (conservative) estimate of the probability of contam-
ination and is bounded according to the relation:
Q(C) ? P(C) Q(C) - B , (A.9)
where
2 2
B = (1/2)k E(f ) (A.10)
Furthermore, if,. under the same conditions, the fraction of released
organisms that would survive and proliferate is independent of the total
number N of organisms released, Q(C) reduces to
Q(C) = E(N) E(f) , (A.11)
which is identical to the Sagan-Coleman formula with E(f) = P(G). The
error bound B becomes
B = (1/2)E(N 2 ) E(f 2 )
= (1/2) [E(N) 2 + Var(N) E(f) 2 + Var(f) . (A.12)
Approximation (A.11) is therefore a reasonably conservative estimate of
the probability of contamination under these circumstances except for
pathological cases where both the probability of contamination and the
variances of N and f are large, in which case it becomes overly conser-
vative, with Q(C) >> P(C). For example, assume that all released organ-
-5
isms survive and reproduce with probability 10 , or all of the organ-
-5
isms die with probability 1 - 10 . Assume also that 100 organisms will
be released, with probability 0.10, or that none will be released. The
expected values of these two variables have remained unchanged and
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Q(C) = 10 x 10 = 10 as before. However, it is clear that under the
conditions assumed, the overall probability of contamination would be
-1 -5 -6
only P(C) = 10 X 10 = 10
If, on the contrary, the fraction of released organisms that would
survive and proliferate and the total number of organisms released are
dependent through a common factor such as the landing outcome, the prob-
ability of contamination is no longer equal to the product of the expected
values E(N) and E(f) but, with a minor modification to Eq. (A.11), can be
computed directly from the joint distribution of N and f conditional on
the common factor, i.e.,
Q(C) = P(Ai ) E(N.) E(fi )  (A.13)
with
th
A = the i landing outcome (hard landing; soft landing)
i
E(N.) = the expected number of organisms released conditional
on the occurrence of A
i
E(f.) = the expected fraction of released organisms that would
survive and reproduce conditional on the occurrence of
A .
This modification is incorporated in the Release Submodel described in
the main body of this report.
130
Appendix B
RELEASE SUBMODEL PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENTS
131
Appendix B
RELEASE SUBMODEL PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENTS
Figure B.1, a duplicate of Figure 3.7, shows the probability assign-
ments used in the Release Submodel. The numbers shown in circles are
expected bioloads as computed in the Bio-Burden Submodel. Also in
Figures B.1 and B.2 are references to the model variables described
below:
Irel--The probability of a hard landing is 0.002.
2rel--The fraction of organisms newly exposed on hard landing.
3rel--Parameter "a" in Figure B.2 was estimated by the authors
to be 0.1, 0.1, and 10-3 respectively for covered,
mated, and encapsulated locations. The fraction newly
exposed is based on fracture ratios and can be computed
by the following equation (assuming uniform distribution
of organisms in the given location):
A (location) - A (location)1 o
f (location) =
ne V(location)
where
A (.) is the surface area of type (.) after fracturing
A (*) is the original surface area of type (*)
V(*) is the volume (or integrated surface area) of type (')
(The role of parameter "a" is explained in Figure B.2.)
PRECEDING PACESBLANK NOT FILMED
See p. 21 of Reference 11.
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MICROBE LANDING RELEASE
LOCATIONMODE MECHANISM VIABILITY
Implantation
0.5 (5rel) VTO IHard 1
0.002 O1rel) VTO
Vibration 0.01 (6rel)
0.5 Non-VTO
0.99
EXTERNAL Implantation 0
0.001 (4rel) VTO
Soft 1
0.998 VTO
0Vibration 0.01
9E0.999 Non-VTO 1
0.99
0
0.05 (2rel) VTO
1
VTO
H V 0.001
0.002 0.05 Non-VTO 1
VTO
0.999
Erosion 0.8
COVERED 0.9 Non-VTO 1
0.2
0
VTO
S 0.8 (7rel)
0.998 Erosion Non-VTO 1
0.2 0
0.05 (2rel) VTO
/1
VTO
H V 0.001
0.002 0.05 Non-VTO 1
9 0.999
VTO
E 0.01 (8rel)
MATED 0.9 Non-VTO 1
0.99
0
VTO
S 0.01
0.998 E Non-VTO 1
0.99
I 0
0.0005 (3rel) VTO
VTO
H V 0.001
0.002 0.0005 Non-VTO 1
0000 0.999
VTO
E 0.0001 (9rel)
ENCAPSULATED 0.999 Non-VTO 1
xpected bio-buiden. 0.9999
0
VTO
S 0.0001
0.998 E Non-VTO
0.9999
FIGURE B.1 TREE FOR VTO RELEASE: PARAMETERS
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a b c d
MICROBE f (') - fraction portion of fraction fraction
LOCATION exposed f Implanted surviving surviving
ne Vibration Erosion
EXTERNAL OR
NEWLY EXPOSED 1.0 0.5 (5rel) 10-2 (6rel) No erosion
COVERED 0.1 (2rel) - - 0.8 (7rel) '
MATED 0.1 (2rel) - - 10 - 2 (8rel)
ENCAPSULATED 10- 3 (3rel) - - 10 (9rel)
Implantation Viable
a-b
VTO
c
Hard Landing Vibration
a-(1-b)
0
Non-VTO
(1-c)
VTO
E rosion
(1-a)
Non-VTO
(1-d)
VTO
Soft Landing Erosion
Non-VTO n
(1 -d)
FIGURE B.2 RELEASE SUBMODEL PARAMETERS
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4rel--The fraction of organisms implanted on a soft landing
is assigned by the authors, using the following tree.
No 0
0.99
Yes
Is Organism on 0
Bottom of Landing Pad? 0.9
Is the Organism
Yes Killed by UV
0.01 During Entry?
SKETCH B
5rel--The fraction of external or newly exposed organisms that
are implanted on hard landing is assigned by the authors
to be 0.5. The role of this probability is explained
in Figure B.2, where it has been renamed "b."
6rel--The fraction of VTOs on external surfaces or newly exposed
that survive release by vibration is assigned by the
authors to be 10-2. This number can be justified as
follows. First, the microbe is not buried in dust; other-
wise,. it would be considered on the implanted branch.
Secondly, it is most likely exposed to the sterilizing
UV flux, which is fatal for all microbes after a period
of hours. Therefore, the only surviving organisms on
external surfaces are those shielded or shaded from
direct and reflected radiation. We assume the fraction
of external surface area meeting this criterion is 10-2.
The role of this probability is explained in Figure B.2,
where it has been renamed "c."
7rel--The probability of VTOs on covered surfaces surviving
release by erosion was assigned as 0.8 by the authurs.
We assume the release is from a "black box," of which
a "corner" has been eroded away. The volume of the box
near the corner (we assume 20 percent) is exposed to
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the lethal soil abrasion process and the remainder is
not. Thus we give the microbe an 80 percent chance
of survival. (NASA specifications range from 10- 2 to
1.0. )8
8rel--The fraction of VTOs on mated surfaces surviving release
by erosion is assigned as 10-2 for reasons similar to
those in the previous note. (The NASA specification is
10-3. )8
9rel--We understand from Exotech that this probability of
encapsulated organisms surviving erosion is based on
work at Boeing (supervised by the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory) and has been assigned a value of 10 - 4.36
The role of the three variables above is explained in
Figure B.2, where they have been renamed "d."
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Appendix C
TRANSPORT SUBMODEL PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENTS
Figure C.1 is a duplicate of Figure 3.12 and is used as a reference
to identify the various transitions of the six-state Markov Transport model.
Transition probability assignments are discussed below in the order of their
numbering. (Transition i is represented by transition probability Pi.)
P1 Survive Transit (1tra)
Ultraviolet radiation of the intensity found on the Martian surface
is normally considered lethal to microorganisms after an exposure time
of a few minutes. The fraction of B. Subtilis spores surviving after an
exposure of t minutes can be approximated by the following formula:
-Iat
f =e , (C.1)
s
which fits a curve in Hollaender's47 Figure 2-8. "I" is the UV flux:
20 ergs/sec/mm2 (approximately 0.2 Wsq ft). "a' is a constant with a
value of 23 (computed to fit Hollaender's curve). Using this relation-
ship, we can compute the fraction surviving this nominal UV flux for
several values of t, as shown in Table C.1. Other spores may be more
or less resistant to UV flux but iot iln a proportion that could change
significantly the above results.
Attenuation of UV flux during dust storms is insufficient to protect
unshielded terrestrial organisms for much longer time periods. The
fraction of the UV flux received on the Martian surface during a dust
storm can be approximated by:
141PiWCfiN'G PAESBLANK NOT FIED
VTOs RELEASED LODGED
BY VIBRATION - WITH
0.11 SHIELD P10,11 = 0.0005
P9 = 0.9985
P 0.001 REACHED
USABLE
13 = 0.5 WATER
P4 = 0.5P
SURVIVED VTOs TRANSIT 0.005
LODGING RELEASED BY
IMPLANTATION
0.045
5,7
0.495
NONVIABLE
P12 0.5 P1 = 0.01
P23 = 0.99
VTOs RELEASED
BY EROSION DUSTBORNE
14.89
0 Transient 
State
(0 Holding State
O Trapping State
P.'s refer to transition probabilities between states.
FIGURE C.1 TRANSPORT MARKOV MODEL: PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENTS
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Table C.1
FRACTION OF SPORES SURVIVING 2 X 103 erg/sec/cm2 FLUX
Values of T (minutes)
1 10 100
-2 -20 -200
f (t) 10 10 10
f = e T/ (C.2)
t
Equation.(C.2) states that the fraction of UV radiation transmitted from
above the "atmosphere" to the surface (ft) is approximated by an expo-
nential involving the optical thickness (T) and the cosine of the angle
between a normal to the surface and the sun (p). In a paper summarizing
values of "T" from Mariner IX data, Pang4 6 shows that during the 1970
November-December global dust storm the value of T ranged from 0.5 to
0.9. Using Eq. (C.2) we compute values of ft, assuming I = 1. (See
Table C.2.)
Table C.2
FRACTION OF UV FLUX TRANSMITTED TO THE SURFACE
AS A FUNCTION OF DUST STORM OPTICAL THICKNESS
Normal Dust Heavy Massive
Condition Storm Dust Storm Dust Storm
T 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.8
f (T) 0.74 0.45 0.27 0.16
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Note that even with T = 1.8 (a value much higher than Pang's data indicate)
the flux attenuation is less than an order of magnitude. Revising Table C.1
by using an optical thickness of 1.8 yields the data in Table C.3.
Table C.3
FRACTION OF SPORES SURVIVING
ATTENUATED UV FLUX
Values of t (minutes)
1 10 100
-5 -44
f (t) 0.38 4 X10 10
s
Exposures on the order of tens of minutes to a few hours (depending on
sun angle) even during dust storms seem therefore to be lethal to all
unshielded organisms.
We are thus left to consider the microbes that do find shielding.
These would most likely be in spore colonies or as individual spores at-
tached in a shielded manner to some landed or indigenous particle. We
-2
assign the probability of an organism finding such a shield as 10
Note that Hagen et al.21 observed reductions of two orders of magnitude
over a period of several weeks in populations of B. Cereus and B. Sub-
tilis airborne in simulated Martian dust cloud.
P Death During Transit2,3
Two mechanisms may render microbes nonviable while in transit: UV
radiation (2) and soil abrasion (3). We believe that UV radiation domi-
nates abrasion for unshielded organisms and that abrasion has an
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insignificant effect on shielded organisms. Thus we compute the transi-
tion probability P2, 3 as the complement of probability PI:
P = 1.0 - 0.01 = 0.99
2,3
P4 Find Lodging with Shield (3tra)
To be in a position to take transition number four, the organism
must have survived the transport process. Given this survival, two in-
ferences are likely:
* The microbe is in a colony that was transported.
* The microbe is otherwise shielded by some mass to which it is
attached.
The question now is "How can this organism find a home that will provide
lodging and UV shielding until the next storm?" Indeed, the only lodging
that it need find is that which will be sufficient for the additional
order of magnitude in UV flux during non-storm periods. Conditioned on
the fact that the organism has survived thus far, we assume it is a
50/50 proposition and that it will be able to find the additional shielding.
P5 Permanently Lodged
We treat Transitions 5 and 7 as the same. Transition 5 refers to
an organism becoming permanently lodged without water after any storm.
We will exclude from our definition of "permanent lodging" the event of
water being deposited on this organism. Thus we can treat a permanently
lodged microbe as one that is nonviable. See Transition P7*
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P 6 Find Water (2tra)
Table C.4 contains a list of possible existence mchanisms for
water in a usable form on Mars. Most terrestrial organisms require water
in a liquid form to proliferate; however, some organisms are known to
live on water vapor at sufficiently high partial pressure, or on ice at
temperatures greater than -10 C, or on water contained in nutrients or
bound in some form. Because of the triple point problem, we need a
water source, elevated pressure, and heat to create a liquid for any
period of time. Of the mechanisms listed in Table C.4, one of the most
likely has been proposed by C. B. Farmer1 9 of the Jet Propulsion Labo-
ratory. Briefly, the theory is that ice at a depth of 1 cm below the
surface is melted by solar radiation. If the ice is covered by 1 cm of
small dust particles, then the diffusion of water vapor from the "melted"
ice up through the dust layer may be sufficiently retarded to assume
liquid phase "water" under the dust for some period of time. Farmer's
calculations show that the duration of water in the liquid phase could
be on the order of hours. He estimates 39 that 1 percent of the surface
could have the above combination of factors. If we assume that their
existence is uniformly distributed over the Martian surface, then we
can say the organism would have a 1 percent chance of finding a water
environment after any transport by the winds. We need to temper this
assignment by an estimation of the probability that this entire mechanism
does "work" on the surface. We have assigned a probability 0.25 to the
existence of this mechanism.
An alternative mechanism has been proposed by A. P. Ingersoll.3 9
His model suggests liquid phase water is limited to concentrated solutions
of strongly deliquescent salts. After informal discussions with him, we
assess that the fraction of the surface amenable to liquid water is again
roughly 1 percent and the probability of existence of this mechanism is
0.25.
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Table C.4
WATER EXISTENCE MECHANISMS
Fraction of
Source of Probability Surface*
of Where Water
Model H 20 Pressure Heat Existence Is Usable P6
C. B. Farmer Ice Dust Solar radiation 0.25 0.01 0.0025
A. P. Ingersoll Ice Salt pools Solar radiation 0.25 0.01 0.0025
-2 -4 -6
"Black Rock" Ice Ice pocket Solar radiation 10 10 10
polar cap
fringe:10 - 2
-1 -5 -6
Bound H 0 Bound -- -- 10 10 10
2 
-4 -4 -8
Polar Ice Polar Low elevation Geothermal 10 10 10
-2 -7 -9
Geothermal Permafrost Subsurface Geothermal 10 10 10
(M. H. Carr)
-8 -4 -12
Morning Dew Dew Low elevation Solar 10 10 10
-6t  -6 -12
Meteor Impact Ice Subsurface Meteor 10 10 10
Assume uniform distribution unless otherwise noted.
Includes penetration probability.
Looking again at Table C.4, we see that all the other mechanisms
have ; value for Transition P 6 (assigned by the authors) Lhat is much6
lower than the first two. We will therefore ignore the others and compute
Transition P6 using only the Farmer and Ingersoll models. The computation
is as follows:
P = P + p - P (C.3)
6 6F 6I 6FI
Here P refers to the probability found in the last column of the "Farmer"
6F
row in Table C.4. Similarly, P6I is the "Ingersoll" probability. The
last term in Eq. (C.3) is the joint probability than an organism finds
water from both sources in the same spot. Because of the dissimilarity
between the two "liquid" water sources, the authors would assign a value
-3
for P at least an order of magnitude lower than 10 , which for
6FI
practical purposes we call zero.
Thus,
-3
P = 0.0025 + 0.0025 - 0 = 5 X 106
Sensitivity analysis will show that this number and the probability
of surviving UV flux during transit are the two most critical parameters
of the Transport Submodel.
Possible water encounters other than those listed in Table C.4 are
described by Transition 11.
P7 Death Given Transport Survival
Transition 7 is computed with Transition 5 as being the complement
of Transitions 4 and 6:
P = 1.0 - (P + P )
5,7 4 6
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P8 Death While Lodged with Shield (6tra)
Death here could be caused by temperature cycling or some environ-
mental factor other than UV radiation. A difficulty with the assessment
of Transition 11 is that it depends on the definition of the dust storm
cycle and therefore on the definition of what constitutes a dust storm.
As will be seen below, Transition 12 can be interpreted as definition of
a dust storm: an event that has a 50/50 chance of sweeping a lodged mi-
crobe aloft. Transition 8 is assessed by the authors to be 500 times
less likely than Transition 12, that is, the microbe has a 0.002 proba-
bility of being killed before being picked up by the next storm. Transi-
-3
tion 8 has therefore a probability of 10 in the nominal case (P = 0.5).12
P9 Survive Lodging
Survived lodging is a complement of Transitions 8, 10, and 11:
P= 1.0 - (P + P + P )9 8 10 11
P Alternate Transport Mechanism10
Probability 10 refers to the existence of an alternate transport
mechanism: vibration, earthquakes, and the like. We model the question
-5
as shown in Sketch C. Taking the expectation, we find P /P = 1010 12
-6
or P 5 X 10
10
P Water Deposition on Organism (4tra)
Assuming it survives the transport process, an organism is most
likely to be left in a dry location. However, there may well be a rare
event that would cause usable water to be deposited at the microbe's
site. Transition 11 accounts for this event.
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This rare event is to be distinguished from those events in Transi-
Occurrence of
Alternate No
Transport insechanism 0an organ sm lands in a spot that is initiallyPrior to Transport
by Next Storm
SKETCH C
This rare event is to be distinguished from those events in Transi-
tion 6. If, for instance, an organism lands in a spot that is initially
dry but will produce water by one of the methods in Table C.4 at some time
during the microbe's stay, we consider this event to be part of Transition 6.
On the other hand, if water were deposited by some means not explained in
Table C.4, we would want to consider it as part of Transition 11.
Transition 11 is defined as rare compared with Transition 6, which
-3 -4
equals 5 X 10 . The authors assign Transition 11 as equal to 5 x 10
that is, 10 times less probable than Transition 6 and two times less
probable than Transition 8, death while lodged with shield. In other
words, the probability that usable water will be deposited on a VTO lodged
with shield by some other means than described in Table C.4 and prior to
-3
transport by the next dust storm is equal to 10 .
Transition P becomes negligible compared with P .
10 11
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PI2 Swept Aloft by the Next Dust Storm (5tra)
We assign 0.5 to the probability that VTOs lodged with shield in
any location will be swept aloft by the next dust storm. This probability
alternatively defines the magnitude of Martian winds that qualify as dust
storms. The output of the model is very insensitive to this number since
most VTOs reach usable water during the first dust storm cycle.
P 1 3 Stay Lodged
Transition 13 is the complement of Transition 12: the fraction of
VTOs not picked up by the next storm but eventually available for trans-
port at a later period. That is, P13 1.0 - P 2
13 12
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